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UNBUNDLING RISK
*

Lee Anne Fennell

In a 1963 lecture, Kenneth Arrow posited a world featuring complete markets in risk
that would permit anyone “to bet, at fixed odds, any amount he wishes on the occurrence
of any event which will affect his welfare in any way.”1 Under such a system, no human
endeavor or experience would come with a fixed quantum of risk or insurance immutably
bundled with it; rather, risk would be an à la carte element that could be bought and sold
in any increment to suit the tastes and needs of each individual. A great deal of creative
work over the past several decades has examined ways to move closer to that ideal. Some
of the most intriguing proposals would allow ordinary people to shift risks that
profoundly affect their lives, such as those involving the value of their homes or their
income potential.2 The growing literature on risk rearrangement has addressed not only
how additional risks might be buffered, but also how existing protection against risk
might be shed through “reverse insurance” or “anti-insurance” products.3 For example, a
number of scholars have examined the merits of allowing individuals to sell their
*

Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful questions, comments, and
conversations about this project, I thank Rosalind Dixon, Frank Easterbrook, Mark Fenster, Christopher
Fennell, Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Saul Levmore, Jonathan Nash, William Page, Ariel Porat, Alex
Raskolnikov, Alan Schwartz, Michael Wolf, and participants in presentations at Columbia University
School of Law, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University
of Illinois College of Law, the University of Florida College of Law, and the 2008 Midwestern Law and
Economics Association Meeting. Prisca Kim, Catherine Kiwala, and Eric Singer provided excellent
research assistance.
1
Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk and Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISKBEARING 134, 138 (1971) (originally delivered in the Yrjö Jahnsson lecture series in Helsinki in December
1963) [hereinafter “Arrow, Insurance”]. The Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, developed in prior
work by Arrow and by Gerard Debreu, contemplates complete markets in contingent claims. See, e.g.,
DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 35 & 345 n. 36
(2002) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV.
ECON. STUD. 91 (1964) [original French version, 1953]; GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN
AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, ch. 7 (1959)); see also Robert Hockett, What Kinds of
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPS, Other SOPS, and “Ownership Societies,” 92
CORNELL L. REV. 865, 945-46 & n. 332 (2007) (discussing the intellectual history of “Arrow securities,”
which pay out based on various states of the world and facilitate trading in risk).
2
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 107-10
(2003); see also Parts II.C and D, infra.
3
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 219-20 (1970) (describing "reverse
insurance"); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002) (proposing “antiinsurance” in contract and torts contexts); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1821, 1883-84, 1893-95
(1995) (discussing “disinsurance”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546 (1987) (noting potential role for “reverse or anti-insurance”); Eric Kades,
Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1496-1500 (1999) (proposing "reverse insurance" for offloading the upside
risk of windfalls).
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“unmatured” tort claims—that is, claims based on injuries that have not yet occurred.4
New innovations for moving risk around outside of traditional insurance markets
continue to appear, and still more can be readily imagined.5
Despite significant academic and entrepreneurial interest in expanding risk markets,
the stakes that individuals hold in the outcomes of a wide range of activities and
enterprises continue to follow deeply entrenched patterns. People are often unable to
modify the risk positions specified by background legal and social arrangements, whether
those positions produce unwanted coverage or unwanted exposure.6 These rigidities are
not uniformly distributed, however. Not only are there striking differences between the
risk customization opportunities available to sophisticated financial actors and to
individuals,7 but the suite of risk management tools to which ordinary households have
access is marked by unexplained asymmetries and puzzling gaps. Examples are plentiful.
It is easy to insure against accidents, but impossible to shed the implicit insurance that
comes bundled with the tort system. It is routine to buy fire insurance, but difficult to
insure against the risk of fluctuations in the local housing market.8 It is unremarkable to
retain an entitlement to risky future income streams, but unusual to explicitly sell off the
right to receive them—and virtually unheard of to place bets that would double one’s
return from them.9

4

See, e.g., Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987);
Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383 (1989); Stephen D.
Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558 (1985); see also ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 77 (1974); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 822, 867 (1993); see also Part II.B.1, infra.
5
See infra Part II for examples.
6
If people could shed risk and insurance with equal and perfect ease, law’s initial allocations would
not stand in the way of efficient reallocations. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON.
1 (1960); see also Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 134-43 (discussing and analyzing incompleteness in
insurance markets).
7
Derivatives are used by business entities to transfer risk in innumerable ways. See, e.g., PHELIM
BOYLE & FEIDHLIM BOYLE, DERIVATIVES: THE TOOLS THAT CHANGED FINANCE xi (2001). Indeed, Alan
Greenspan explicitly described them as adding value by “unbundling risks.” See Alan Greenspan, Federal
Reserve Board, Financial Derivatives, Remarks Before the Futures Industry Association, Boca Raton,
Florida, Mar. 19, 1999, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/1999/19990319.htm. To allude to such riskshifting mechanisms in the current economic climate invites the reaction that risk-rearrangement
innovations should be more tightly curtailed rather than made more broadly available. A discussion of the
causes of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, but the difficulties have been broadly
associated with the mispricing of risk. For a recent overview, see Susan M. Wachter, The Ongoing
Financial Upheaval: Understanding the Sources and Way Out (August 27, 2009). U of Penn, Inst for Law
& Econ Research Paper No. 09-30, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1464791. While it is true that
trading in risk is a condition precedent to mispricing it, pricing flaws can be addressed without dismantling
risk markets altogether.
8
Some explicit mechanisms do exist for hedging or insuring against housing market risks, but these
are not in widespread use and are unavailable as a practical matter to the great majority of households. See
infra Part II.C.1.
9
The conceptual case for such a bet is set out in Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 218-21.
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The absence of explicit risk markets in a given domain does not mean that people are
utterly unable to adjust their exposure to variance. The point, rather, is that they can often
only do so by selecting or refusing a package that also contains some other good, service,
activity, or endeavor. For example, a person who does not want to risk a loss in home
value can rent instead.10 An individual who does not want the high variance in income
that characterizes a life as an artist can sell her labor to an employer pursuant to a longterm contract. Within limits, one can work at a riskier job in exchange for higher pay or
consume cheaper products that come with greater health and safety risks. But, outside of
a few varieties of insurance, it is difficult for individuals to engage in free-standing or
unbundled risk adjustments. The distinction is not trivial. If risk levels cannot be
independently adjusted, heterogeneous risk preferences can distort other consumption and
activity choices, reduce welfare, or both. Certain kinds of private bargains capable of
improving incentive structures are also precluded if risk cannot be traded separately.11
More broadly, society’s policy menu is impoverished if individuals cannot undo risk
allocations that are packaged within particular societal arrangements, or if they can only
reduce exposure from a given baseline but not increase it.
Risk innovation always attempts a finer-grained unbundling of risk from the products,
services, conditions, or activities in which it is embedded.12 Once unmoored, risk can be
shifted in virtually unlimited ways, allowing parties to move freely from risk to coverage
(insurance) and from coverage to risk (reverse insurance). Most of the existing work in
this area has focused on the merits of revised risk allocations within particular contexts.
This paper takes a different tack by examining questions surrounding risk unbundling
itself—the costs and benefits of allowing people to reverse default risk arrangements
selectively.13 My analysis focuses primarily on risks routinely encountered by individuals
and households—contexts where stand-alone risk reallocation opportunities are often
absent or constrained, and cognitive and social considerations loom large.14 As both a
10

Similarly, one can hedge against future price increases in a given local housing market by actually
buying a house in that market or in a correlated market. See, e.g., Todd Sinai & Nicholas S. Souleles,
Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against Rent Risk, 120 Q.J. ECON. 763 (2005).
11
For example “anti-insurance” contracts that place the risk of loss on both parties to an interaction
require the participation of a third party that can enter into transactions over risk. See Cooter & Porat, supra
note 3; infra Part I.C.
12
Risk innovation is not always framed in these terms, of course, but the “unbundling” characterization
has been explicitly used by, e.g., Greenspan, supra note 7.
13
Perhaps the most well-developed body of literature addressing the ability to undo background
arrangements is in the area of contract default rules. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Omri Ben-Shahar &
John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006). While relevant to
the present discussion—contracts do allocate risk, among other things—a gap remains between this
literature and broader questions of risk reversibility among parties who are not otherwise in contractual
relationships with each other.
14
The possibility that people may act irrationally in making insurance decisions, and that framing and
defaults might play a role, has received significant attention. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly,
Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 63,
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regulator and an important direct provider of risk pooling services, government has an
interest in fostering the set of risk modification tools that will most cost-effectively
achieve its policy ends. But it is not obvious whether this means prohibiting unbundled
risk transactions, allowing market-based moves away from default risk allocations (with
or without added degrees of stickiness built in), subsidizing the development of new
markets in risk, or directly providing risk customization opportunities. As scholarly and
entrepreneurial interest in risk innovations continues to intensify, these questions will
become increasingly pressing. This paper provides a framework for answering them.
I do not make a normative case here for giving people vastly expanded access to risk
rearrangement opportunities, nor do I advocate for particular additions to the risk menu.
Instead, the project is an analytic one that classifies possible risk moves and probes their
logical and practical similarities and differences. Part of the inquiry involves examining
risk-bearing patterns and asking whether the lines that currently separate the available
from the unavailable, the permissible from the forbidden, the routine from the rare, track
meaningful normative distinctions or whether they are instead artifacts of tradition or
framing. For example, reverse insurance schemes sound quite exotic, but they do nothing
more than reproduce the risk allocation that would have prevailed in the absence of some
insurance mechanism, whether explicit or embedded in law or policy.15
Thinking about risk customization as a distinct issue also allows us to sharpen, refine,
and differentiate among objections and obstacles. Arguments about the merits or
sustainability of a particular risk allocation endstate, for instance, carry different
implications than arguments about the ease with which customization can be
accomplished or the desirability of preserving homogeneity in risk arrangements.
Likewise, some concerns about risk markets center on features of risk reallocation that
are not essential to the reallocation itself and that are therefore amenable to designarounds. For example, the worry that people will sell unmatured tort claims out of a
myopic desire for an immediate lump of cash could be addressed by restructuring the
time and manner in which the expected value equivalent of a potential tort claim is
delivered.16 Here, the real objection pertains not to the unbundling of risk from
underlying tort arrangements, but rather to the failure to also unbundle risk from certain
malleable payment features.
Beyond identifying functional equivalences and spurious connections, viewing risk as
a potentially segregable element opens the door to untapped design innovations. For
example, because reverse insurance mechanisms are virtually unknown, it is typical to
compare mandatory insurance regimes with voluntary opt-in regimes while ignoring the
possibility of an opt-out regime—despite the potential advantages of the latter
88-97 (2005); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 106, 114 (2002).
15
For an overview of implicit insurance provided through various laws and benefit programs, see
MOSS, supra note 1, at 314-15 tbl. 10.2.
16
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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alternative.17 While I will leave to others the question of whether such redesigns would
ultimately prove normatively attractive, I raise them here because they offer
underexplored approaches that appear to be broadly consistent with some of the policy
goals that have been articulated in discussions of risk and insurance.
The paper proceeds in four parts. After briefly reviewing why people might want to
take on or shed risk, Part I presents a taxonomy of risk-reallocating transactions. I refer to
these moves collectively as “risk/expected value exchanges” or “REVEs.” Part II surveys
REVEs that presently exist outside of traditional insurance markets, as well as gaps
where new REVEs might emerge. Part III considers whether greater risk customization
would be likely to advance efficiency by examining some of the reasons that risk
reallocation opportunities are currently blocked or missing. Part IV synthesizes and
builds on the analysis in the previous parts. After suggesting that existing gaps and
asymmetries in opportunities to alter risk positions do not map well onto plausible
normative distinctions, I show how minor design tweaks might counter identified
problems with certain kinds of REVEs. I close by examining new policy alternatives that
emerge from a focus on society’s dual tasks of setting default risk allocations and
choosing the level of stickiness.18
I. REARRANGING RISK: WHY AND HOW
A. Why Insure or Uninsure?
To frame the analysis that follows, it is first helpful to ask why rearranging risk might
be worthwhile from either a societal or individual perspective. The standard economic
account emphasizes two considerations. First, if risk is shifted to a party who is in a better
position to reduce the odds of a negative occurrence or to increase the odds of a positive
occurrence, the shift can improve the mix of bad and good events.19 A corollary of this
point is that removing risk from a party who is in a good position to control events can
lead to losses due to moral hazard.20 This line of analysis emphasizes the beneficial
incentive effects of exposure (or the detrimental incentive effects of nonexposure).21
Second, efficiency gains can be achieved if risk averse individuals transfer risk to
parties who have a greater ability to diversify, spread, or pool it, or who are simply less

17

See infra Part IV.C (examining the significance of default selections).
Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972) (noting that society must make two
decisions about entitlements—who will be granted the entitlement, and how it will be protected).
19
This point is associated with Guido Calabresi’s notion of the “cheapest cost avoider.” See
CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 136-38; see also MOSS, supra note 1, at 232-34 (discussing “efficient risk
shifting”).
20
See infra Part III.B.1.
21
Significantly, this set of considerations comes into play only when it is impossible to fully
disaggregate risk from factors under the control of a particular party.
18
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averse to risk.22 Risk aversion, in turn, is typically explained by reference to the
diminishing marginal utility of money, which would cause people to prefer small but
certain monetary gains and losses over larger but less likely gains and losses that have the
same expected values.23 Scholars have characterized insurance as a device for moving
money from states of the world in which it produces lower marginal utility to ones in
which it produces greater marginal utility.24 We would expect a utility-maximizing
person to continue this process until—and only until—the marginal utilities are equalized
across her various possible futures.25 In Richard Zeckhauser’s words, “[t]he rule comes
down to spending your money where it does the most good.”26
A focus on the diminishing marginal utility of money reveals not only why people
might buy insurance but also why they might want to refrain from doing so. Money
produces greater marginal utility after an event has happened than it did before only if the
event either directly reduces one’s monetary resources, such as one’s earning capacity, or
otherwise changes one’s need for or utility from money.27 Some of the most devastating
losses that people experience—the death of a minor child, or severe pain and suffering—
typically do not produce monetary losses and are not usually thought to increase the
marginal utility of money—in fact, they may do the opposite.28 In these cases, moving
money from the pre-loss state of the world to the post-loss state would reduce utility. The
same reasoning explains why people might at times wish to “sell” existing insurance (say,
from a baseline of tort coverage) by accepting exposure to risk in exchange for a
payment.29
These points, which have been marshaled in support of various tort reform
22

See, e.g., MOSS, supra note 1, at 33-35; Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 36.
See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 508-09 (3d ed. 2000); Croley & Hanson,
supra note 3, at 1786, 1794-96. Work pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky raises important
challenges to this account by finding that people show aversion to losses (from a given reference point),
rather than to risk as such, and that they are disproportionately sensitive to small losses from that reference
point. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Paul Slovic et al., Preferences for Insuring
Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67-70 (Paul
Slovic, ed., 2000)
24
See, e.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic Illness, 21 PUB. POL’Y 149, 156-57
(1973).
25
See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 156; Priest, supra note 3, at 1546; Croley & Hanson, supra
note 3, at 1795 & diagram 2.
26
Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 155.
27
See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 388-92; David Friedman, What Is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death
or Injury? 2 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 85-87 (1982); see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 17971802 (providing an overview of the conventional view on this issue).
28
See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1546-47; Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform:
A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-64 (1988); Cooter, supra note 4, at 389; Croley & Hanson,
supra note 3, at 1797-1802; W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on Health
Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353, 371 (1990).
29
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 27, at 84 (1982); Priest, supra note 3, at 1547; see also Croley &
Hanson, supra note 3, at 1799-1802 (discussing the conventional wisdom on this point).
23
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proposals,30 are open to a number of caveats and qualifications. Perhaps most
foundationally, it is no more self-evident that individuals should wish to maximize utility
over an entire lifetime and across all possible states of the world than it is that societies
should want to maximize utility across their populations.31 Even if lifetime utility
maximization is the goal, it is possible that changes in total utility levels affect the
marginal utility of money, independent of wealth.32 For example, the possibility that
people derive “consolation” utility from the fact of being compensated after a loss, quite
apart from the utility that the money itself will produce, adds an interesting wrinkle.33
Moreover, the marginal utility of money may not always smoothly decline across all
ranges; there may be discontinuities and ranges in which the marginal utility of money is
increasing.34 Individual differences along these and other dimensions are sources of
heterogeneity that may prove policy relevant.
B. REVEs: A Taxonomy
Now that we have some idea why people might want to engage in transactions to
reallocate risk, we can begin to categorize those transactions. Risk/expected value
exchanges (REVEs) are a theoretical possibility whenever there is variance in future
states of the world35 and enough information about the distribution of those states to
calculate an expected value.36 In the simplest REVE, one party receives or pays the
expected value (in all states of the world),37 while the other party accepts the bundle of
future possible states that carry that expected value, ultimately suffering or enjoying the
loss or gain, if any, in the state of the world that actually obtains (or reconveying the
bundle to someone else who will do so). Of course, real-world REVEs involve an amount
added to (or deducted from) the expected value for administrative costs and profits, but
30

For a survey of reforms premised on this analysis, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1804-12.
See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1832; id. at 1825 n. 125..
32
See Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1813-22; Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 83-84.
33
See Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions, 20
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 145-46 (2000) (presenting the “consolation hypothesis” to explain
experimental results in which people were willing to devote more time to obtain a fixed amount of
compensation for a damaged object when asked to imagine that they loved the object); see also Kunreuther
& Pauly, supra note 14, at 84, 93.
34
The Friedman-Savage utility curve, which was developed to explain apparent anomalies in riskrelated behavior, embodies the hypothesis that there are intervals within which the marginal utility of
money is increasing. See, e.g., Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving
Risk, 56 J. POLIT. ECON. 279, 298-99 (1948); see also CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 39-40; CHARLES
KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 67-81, 127-29 (2007).
35
Although risk is colloquially associated primarily with negative events, its economic meaning refers
to variance, whether positive or negative. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 3, at 1496 & n.17.
36
There are some practical limits on the availability of REVEs. For example, insurance will not be a
realistic possibility if the event in question will produce widespread correlated losses, as in the case of a
nuclear war. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1540.
37
Variations would be possible in which the expected value is paid or received only in those states of
the world in which a given event does not occur. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 27, at 84.
31
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we can safely omit that factor from this stage of the analysis.38 More problematic is the
fact that the transaction itself, by altering who bears the risk, may also alter the amount of
the expected loss or gain—a point that relates to moral hazard, taken up below.39
A more foundational wrinkle is that even the most basic and familiar REVE,
insurance, often does not involve literally offloading potential losses (which may be
nonpecuniary in nature), but rather contracting for a set of monetary payouts that will be
triggered by particular losses.40 We can keep the analysis simple by imagining there is a
single event, R, that will occur with some known probability—the cosmic equivalent of
drawing a red ball from an urn.41 R may already generate consequences for an individual,
Ida. These consequences could be given by nature (as where R is Ida’s broken arm), the
product of embedded legal arrangements (as where R is someone else’s broken arm for
which tort law makes Ida liable), or both (as where R delivers Ida both a broken arm and
some amount of compensation).42 Or R might be some event that currently carries no
consequences for Ida, such as the outcome of a horse race on which Ida has not yet
placed any bets. In any of these situations, Ida might prefer not to simply accept the
consequences (or lack thereof) that R produces for her in the baseline situation. She
might wish to buy or sell tickets that attach new consequences to, or remove existing
consequences from, R’s occurrence.43
If Ida would like to attach a positive consequence to R’s occurrence, such as a payout
of money, or would like to detach a negative consequence from R’s occurrence, such as
liability to pay someone else money, she must pay the expected value of that
consequence.44 If, on the other hand, Ida wants to detach a positive consequence from
R’s occurrence, such as money that would ordinarily come to her when R happens, or
attach a negative consequence to R’s occurrence, such as liability to pay someone else,
she will be entitled to receive the expected value equivalent of the consequence.45 Either
way, she is engaging in a REVE—an exchange of expected value for risk.
From Ida’s perspective, then, there are “event-enhancing REVEs” that cost her
money and improve the consequences tied to a probabilistic event like R (whether by
38

These costs may, however, bear on the choice of a default risk allocation. See infra Part IV.C.1.
See infra Part III.B.1. I thank Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi for comments on this point.
40
Insurers, after all, can only pay with money. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1546; Croley &
Hanson, supra note 3, at 1797.
41
Similar hypotheticals involving draws from urns have been given to participants in research on risk
and insurance. See Slovic et al., supra note 23, at 54-55.
42
R could also be an event that will carry consequences that are positive for Ida.
43
See HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 47 (1978)
(describing insurance and similar devices as “tickets that can be cashed in for money if certain states of
nature occur”).
44
Suppose there is a ten percent chance of R. Under conditions of perfect competition and zero
administrative costs, Ida could pay $100 for a ticket that pays out $1000 if R happens (and zero if it does
not happen), or that, alternatively, relieves her of $1000 of liability associated with the occurrence of R.
45
Continuing with the example in note 44, supra, Ida might receive $100 in exchange for issuing a
ticket that entitles its bearer to receive $1000 (from Ida, or from whoever would have previously had to pay
Ida) upon the occurrence of R.
39
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adding a positive consequence or detaching a negative one) and “event-detracting
REVEs” that deliver cash but worsen the consequences for her of an event like R
(whether by tying her future liability to R or removing some positive consequence that
was previously bundled with R). Of course, the party on the other side of the monetary
transaction incurs or enjoys a converse change in the consequences of event R. Thus, the
terms “event-enhancing” and “event-detracting” refer to two sides of the same
transaction, not to distinct transaction types.
1. Enhancements and Detractions
It is easy to tell whether Ida is paying out dollars or receiving dollars, and hence easy
to tell whether the REVE is (from her perspective) event-enhancing or event-detracting.
But this fact does not tell us everything we need to know about the transaction. To see
why, suppose Ida makes an expected value payment to improve the consequences
attaching to event R. Depending on what R represents, that improvement might take any
of the forms schematically shown in Figure 1.46

Figure 1:
Event Enhancements
(a) ditch fill

(b) gravy

(c) hybrid

First, as shown in Figure 1(a), Ida might be purchasing protection against the risk of
loss from her current baseline, as with fire insurance. Her expected value payment gives
her the right to receive a sum that will offset a loss delivered up by nature; the payoff will
fill in a ditch that this event will leave in her wealth.47 Second, as shown in Figure 1(b),
Ida might make an expected value payment to buy a chance at an upside gain, as with a
lottery ticket.48 Third, as shown in Figure 1(c), Ida might purchase a blended product
with her expected value payment, as implicitly occurs under a products liability regime
46

The possibilities depicted in the figures in this subpart are not exhaustive. In addition to many
intermediate cases between those shown, REVEs might intensify rather than offset above- or belowbaseline impacts already associated with R. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3; text accompanying note 127,
infra. It is also important to clarify that the figures in this subpart depict only the alteration in consequences
associated with event R, and not the expected value payment that was paid or received to bring it about.
47
The question of what constitutes a "ditch" in this context is not always straightforward. See text
accompanying notes 54-55, infra.
48
Such a “pure gamble” falls somewhat outside the core concerns of this paper, but it offers an
intuitive image of an above-baseline REVE.
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featuring punitive damages. As commentators have noted, punitive damage multipliers
effectively force consumers to purchase lottery tickets along with their products or
services.49 In such a case, the expected value payment made as part of a consumer's
purchase entitles her both to payments that will “backfill” her injuries and to a chance at
additional “gravy.”
A similar range of possibilities exists when Ida receives an expected value payment in
exchange for accepting unfavorable consequences if R occurs. As shown in Figure 2, this
trade may leave her vulnerable to an unfilled ditch, as shown in 2(a), may merely expose
her to the loss of a possible gain, as in 2(b), or may do a bit of both as shown in 2(c).
Figure 2:
Event Detractions
(a) ditch

(b) lost gravy

(c) hybrid

Given the conceptual symmetry between the event-enhancing and event-detracting
sides of REVEs, it is noteworthy that individual consumers and households have limited
opportunities to engage in explicit event-detracting REVEs,50 while explicit eventenhancing REVEs (insurance and lotteries) are familiar features of the economic
landscape. The explanation cannot simply be that society is unwilling as a general matter
to allow people to be exposed to “ditches.” People are allowed to remain uninsured
against many risks that could dramatically reduce their well being. Indeed, they are
routinely allowed to engage in transactions that contain event-detracting REVEs
embedded within them.51 Moreover, as Figure 2 illustrates, event-detracting REVEs can
involve selling chances at lucky gains rather than selling coverage of unlucky losses.52
49

See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2230 (1999) ("In effect, the introduction of a multiplier turns the liability
component of the price into a lottery ticket, with a bigger price up front supporting the chance of a bigger
payoff at the end”); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 211-12 (2008) ("patients are effectively forced to buy a kind of lottery
ticket, one that might be worth anything from millions of dollars to nothing").
50
Some exceptions are discussed in Part II, infra.
51
This occurs, for example, whenever an individual accepts a less safe product or service at a lower
price, takes a less safe job at a higher wage, or gives up a variable future income stream in exchange for a
more certain one through an employment contract.
52
See, e.g., Kades, supra note 3, at 1496-1501 (examining the potential for the ex ante transfer of
chances at windfalls through “reverse insurance” or a societal equivalent). Governmental mandates can
produce the same risk endstate as a voluntary transaction to cede upside chances. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 915 (9th ed. 2008) (describing “split-award” statutes that
require some fraction of punitive damages awards to be paid to the state); Christine Hurt, The Windfall

12

Fennell

[27-Apr-10

This last point is taxonomically crucial, and points to a second way of dividing up
REVEs.
2. Upside and Downside Risk
As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, knowing the direction in which the expected value
payment flows tells us only whether a given REVE is event-enhancing or eventdetracting; it does not tell us whether that REVE involves upward or downward
departures from a given baseline. For the same reason, event-detracting REVEs do not
necessarily increase risk. One event-detracting REVE may increase the variance in
possible outcomes by letting a ditch stand unfilled in one state of the world, while another
may instead reduce the variance in possible outcomes by eliminating the chance of a
lucky gain. Similarly, event-enhancing REVEs may either increase variance by boosting
consequences from a baseline state of the world or decrease variance by delivering a
payment that offsets a potential loss.
Of course, the baselines depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are malleable, and the question of
whether some event leaves one with a “ditch” or merely fails to generate “gravy” is open
to interpretation and sensitive to framing.53 For example, suppose a worker purchases
wage-replacement insurance that will pay out at an escalating annual rate designed to
match her anticipated future wage trajectory in the event that she loses her capacity to
continue in her present job. Has this worker insured against a loss or gambled for a gain?
The answer depends on whether the relevant baseline features no future salary payments
at all, salary payments that continue indefinitely at present levels, salary payments that
escalate over time in accordance with the worker's projected earning profile, or some
other earnings pattern.
Another ambiguity is whether baseline states (and moves from them) should be
defined in terms of utility or wealth. Not all losses that negatively affect utility negatively
affect wealth.54 Choosing the right metric requires deciding why we care about the
distinction between upside and downside risk. As we will see, low wealth levels may lead
to claims on societal resources, making unremediated “money ditches” a matter of
particular concern. Conversely, because standard economic theory dictates that it is
irrational to insure against utility drops that do not increase the marginal utility of
money,55 we would expect society to pay less attention to “utility ditches.” As a
Myth, University of Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-023 (2009) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456466, at 3 n.12 (discussing Georgia’s statutory provision reassigning 75% of
punitive damage awards to the state).
53
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
54
See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 388-92 (distinguishing “wealth impacting” from “wealth neutral”
losses); text accompanying notes 27-29, supra.
55
See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 157 (stating that insuring against situations in which utility is
low “is desirable only if the marginal utility of money is higher in the low-utility situation”); see also text
accompanying notes 23-34, supra (describing this conventional view and some critiques of it).
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descriptive matter, however, even utility ditches that do not increase the marginal utility
of money may be framed as losses against which protection is sought by risk-averse
individuals, whether for consolation reasons or otherwise.56
Despite these complications, it remains helpful to add a second distinction that crosscuts the event-enhancing/event-detracting dichotomy outlined above. We can distinguish
between REVEs that deal in downside or “ditch” risk, like those shown in Figures 1(a)
and 2(a), and those that deal in upside or “gravy” risk, like those shown in Figures 1(b)
and 2(b). Putting the two distinctions together as shown in Figure 3 reveals that an
individual can use REVEs to engage in four basic moves.57 These four intuitive moves
map onto the buying and writing of call and put options, respectively58—transactions that
are routinely and symmetrically used by business entities to rearrange risk.59 While these
same four logical possibilities are open, in theory, to individuals, actual risk trading
opportunities are far more limited.
Figure 3: Four Basic Moves (Individual’s Perspective)
Downside “Ditch” Risk
Individual
EV

Pays I. Reducing Downside Risk

Event-Enhancing
Individual
Receives EV
Event-Detracting

Upside “Gravy” Risk
III. Increasing Upside Risk

Buying a Claim to Coverage of Buying a Chance at a Gain
(e.g., Lottery Ticket)
Losses (e.g., Insurance)
II. Increasing Downside Risk

IV. Reducing Upside Risk

Selling One’s Claim to Selling One’s Chance at a Gain
Coverage of Losses (e.g., (e.g., Nobel Prize Winnings)
Unmatured Tort Claim)

Individuals regularly shed downside risk by buying insurance (cell I) and can take on
upside risk by, for example, buying lottery tickets (cell III).60 Less familiarly, an
individual who is already covered by insurance or by societal arrangements that spread
risk might engage in a cell II transaction—receiving money in order to accept exposure to
56

See text accompanying note 33, supra; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 53.
The examples provided in the cells of Figure 3 are tailored to fit an individual’s perspective, but
parties taking the other sides of these REVEs (insurers, reverse insurers, manufacturers, and so on) also
engage in these same basic moves.
58
Specifically, cell I equates to buying a put option, cell III equates to buying a call option, cell II
equates to writing a put option, and cell IV equates to writing a call option. A similar four-square depiction
of calls and puts (with minor layout differences) appears in ROBERT TOMPKINS, OPTIONS EXPLAINED 14 tbl.
1.2 (1991).
59
I do not mean to suggest that calls and puts enable entities to perfectly hedge all risks in all contexts,
only that they offer useful and ubiquitous platforms for attempting to do so.
60
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations, in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, supra note 1, at 4-6 (discussing the examples of "[g]ambling
and insurance" as well as other phenomena that involve uncertainty less directly or obviously).
57
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those risks.61 Likewise, an individual could sell off her claim to a chance at a gain that
may be delivered by law, policy, effort, or nature, as shown in cell IV. Although chances
at true “windfalls” represent one incarnation of these claims,62 transactions might also
involve claims to positive outcomes that are the product of merit or effort (selling one's
chance at winning the Nobel Prize, or a share of one’s future earnings in some creative or
athletic pursuit).63
Hybrid transactions are possible that draw from both of the columns in Figure 3. As
illustrated by Figures 1(c) and 2(c), people often hold rights to payments that are
triggered by losses, but that do more than cover those losses. For example, if one were to
sell one's unmatured tort claim in its entirety, this would involve both a shedding of
upside risk and an acceptance of downside risk—although the “ditch” and “gravy”
components of such transactions might be disaggregated.64 Hybrid transactions can also
combine cells I and IV, as where an individual sells rights to the future appreciation of
her home, using part of the proceeds to purchase protection against downside home value
risk.65 Similarly, cells II and III might be combined in a transaction that amplifies both
upside and downside risk. Consider, for example, an employee who accepts a higher risk
of job loss in exchange for a higher salary (cell II) but who funnels that additional money
into options in the company that will enable her to share in its upside returns (cell III). In
this case, the expected value payment that the individual receives for taking on more
exposure would help to fund the upside claim she purchases.
C. “Triangular” Risk Configurations
So far, I have examined REVEs from the perspective of an individual without
considering the identity of the counterparty. REVEs can pass risk back and forth between
two parties to a risky interaction, such as a potential victim and a potential injurer. The
involvement of a third party insurer or reverse insurer, however, facilitates additional
arrangements in which both parties are effectively insured against, or exposed to, risk.66
61

This move is well captured by the phrase “reverse insurance,” but that moniker has also been applied
to cell IV transactions. See Kades, supra note 3. Similarly, the term “anti-insurance” has been applied to
both cell II and cell III transactions. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3 (discussing anti-insurance for losses
and for gains).
62
See Kades, supra note 3, at 1491 (defining "windfalls as economic gains independent of work,
planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to reward"); see also Hurt, supra note 52
(providing a taxonomy of windfalls and analyzing the use of the word).
63
See Part II.D, infra.
64
For example, it would be possible for parties to selectively sell portions of their unmatured tort
claims, or selectively replace portions of the alienated coverage with first-party insurance. See Cooter,
supra note 4, at 384-85; id. at 387.
65
See infra Part II.C.1. Financial “collars” that combine a call and a put to narrow the possible range of
returns are a familiar example of a hybrid transaction combining cells I and IV.
66
I will focus here on third parties who enter the picture as insurers or reverse insurers. Another
possibility, which I do not discuss, would be for the law to place liability on unrelated third parties as a
default matter, thus inducing them to initiate deals with the parties who are in a better position to control
accidents. See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 136 (considering the implications of assigning the loss of car-
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To reach the “both insured” state, the party that the law has left exposed to the risk
must procure insurance. If losses are left to fall on the injurer, the injurer can obtain thirdparty insurance to cover those losses. If losses are left to fall on the victim, the victim can
obtain first-party insurance. The potential advantages of the “both insured” end state are
fairly intuitive: both parties to an interaction may be risk averse, or may have other
reasons for wishing to carry insurance.67
To reach the “both exposed” state, the party that the law has effectively insured
against the risk must procure reverse (or “anti-”) insurance.68 Thus, if the law places
losses on injurers, prospective victims could sell their potential claims and accept
exposure to any actual losses they may suffer.69 Likewise, if the law leaves the loss on
victims, potential injurers could contract with a third party reverse insurer to pay it
amounts keyed to the losses actually suffered by the victims, in exchange for an expected
value payment. By making side-bets with one of the parties, the reverse insurer brings
about an end-state in which losses effectively fall both on victims and on injurers.70 That
such a “both exposed” regime can enhance efficiency has been intriguingly analyzed by
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat,71 and follows from Cooter's earlier explorations of
“double responsibility at the margin.”72 By driving a wedge between what the injurer
pays and what the victim receives, reverse insurance restores incentives that might
otherwise be dulled by a legal system that assigns the loss to only one of the parties.73
Triangular arrangements are important to a discussion of risk unbundling for at least
two reasons. First, because unbundling risk from background societal arrangements is a
prerequisite to transacting over it with a third party, the advantages associated with
triangular arrangements highlight the potential suboptimality of attempting to adjust risk
exposure purely through bundled consumption or activity choices. Second, as explained

pedestrian accidents to "an arbitrary third party, e.g., television manufacturers").
67
For a recent discussion of why risk neutral corporations nonetheless buy insurance, see Victor P.
Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. LAW & ECON., Iss. 1,
Art. 22 (2009) available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art22.
68
See supra note 3.
69
See supra Part II.B.1.
70
The textual discussion assumes that victims and injurers are not able to collude with each other. An
incentive for collusion exists, because third-party reverse insurance makes the victim and the injurer
collectively responsible for twice the loss, while their collective exposure to the loss in the absence of the
reverse insurer is half that amount. For example, suppose victim A is injured after assigning her claim to
reverse insurer C in a world where B would ordinarily be liable to A. If A and B can keep C from learning
about the injury, B can pay A some positive amount that is less than what he would ordinarily have to pay
on the claim, and both will be better off. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 215-16 (discussing this and
other collusion risks associated with anti-insurance).
71
Although Cooter & Porat focus primarily on the contract context, they briefly explore how their
ideas might apply to tort. Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 225-26.
72
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1985); see also Coase, supra note 6, at 41 (suggesting a “double tax system” that would impose
charges on both parties to a land use dispute).
73
The law could, of course, delink collections from injurers and payments to victims, whether to reach
a “both exposed” state or for other reasons. See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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below, triangular risk configurations can help to address some of the concerns associated
with REVEs.74 The counterintuitive implication is that objections to risk transactions can
sometimes be met by expanding, rather than contracting, opportunities to transact over
risks.
II. REVES, REAL AND IMAGINED
The basic moves identified above can be combined in numerous ways to form REVEs
that range from the ubiquitous to the exotic. Insurance and lotteries are familiar REVEs,
and, at least when offered explicitly, are easy to identify. But many REVEs occur, or
might occur, outside of these contexts. Risks are of course pervasively shifted through the
stock market.75 Contractual arrangements also inevitably allocate risk, whether through
default rules or through shifts from them.76 Examples of less familiar REVEs for
modifying personal and household risks follow, some of which have been implemented
or proposed. The list is not comprehensive, but merely suggestive of the range of
possibilities. Because my focus in this Part is on illustrating risk rearrangements rather
than evaluating them, the brief descriptions here do not attempt to catalogue, much less
address, the many considerations that would bear on the normative desirability or
feasibility of these instruments.
A. Matters of Life and Death
Life insurance and annuities, transactions that might be viewed from the individual’s
perspective as falling into either cell I or III,77 are the most familiar ways to address life
and death risk. But other possibilities exist. For example, viatical and life settlements78
permit an elderly or ill holder of a life insurance policy to sell the right to receive the

74

See infra Part IV.B.2.
See, e.g., Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 138-39 (noting shortcomings in the stock market's riskshifting capacities). Although derivatives and other vehicles for slicing and repackaging risk have
addressed some of the gaps that Arrow identified, these devices have suffered from implementation
problems of their own, as the ongoing financial crisis illustrates.
76
See, e.g., Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 136-37 (noting that to the extent contracts involve the
future, they always involve risk). Some reasons that efficient risk-shifting away from a contractual default
may fail to occur are discussed in Korobkin, supra note 13, at 619-21. See also id. at 633-64 (presenting
results of an experiment designed to test the status quo bias as it applies to contract default terms, including
those governing consequential damages and impossibility, respectively).
77
Which cell to slot the arrangement into depends on whether the loss of life (or, in the case of
annuities, longevity) will create the kind of ditch to which money can respond, or whether the proceeds
instead represent a kind of gravy that leaves the recipient better off in monetary terms. See, e.g., It's a
Wonderful Life (Liberty Films, 1946) (featuring a distraught George Bailey who takes to heart Mr. Potter’s
assessment that he is “worth more dead than alive”).
78
“Viatical settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance policy by a terminally ill person, while “life
settlement” or “senior settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance policy by a senior citizen. See, e.g.,
Jessica Maria Perez, Note, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating Senior Settlements to Be a Financial
Alternative for the Elderly, 10 ELDER L.J. 425, 430 (2002).
75
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proceeds of that policy for an immediate lump sum.79 From the policyholder’s
perspective, these transactions correspond to either cell II or IV.80 Another life-and-death
REVE is the tontine, a form of life insurance that bestows deferred dividends on
individuals who survive beyond a set period, paid from the premiums that policyholders
as a group contribute.81 Freestanding bets on one’s own survival to a date certain are also
possible.82 These transactions, too, might be viewed as corresponding to cell I or cell III.
Steven Croley and Jon Hanson discuss a transaction that would arguably fall into cell
IV: “disinsurance” in which parents would receive a lump sum upon the birth of a child
but take on the obligation to make a much larger payment to the disinsurer in the event
that the child dies before the age of eighteen.83 As the authors explain, the fact that
parents typically experience lower financial burdens after a child dies amounts to a kind
of implicit life insurance carried on the child; the death comes bundled not with an
explicit payout from an insurer, but with significant cost savings that amount to the same
thing.84 If the money that becomes newly available after a child’s death carries lower
marginal utility than would money available while the child is alive, then there is an
efficiency argument for moving money from the state of the world in which the child is
dead to the state of the world in which the child is alive.85 On one view, at least, such a
move amounts to selling “gravy” in the state of the world in which the child has died,
where the bounty will be less appealing.
79

See, e.g., id. at 429. The investor also pays any remaining premiums that come due on the policy. Id.
The financial crisis has heightened demand for these transactions. See, e.g., Jennifer Hodson, Clients Cash
in Policies—Life-Settlement Industry Sees Growth as People Seek Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009.
Although these mechanisms have been criticized, the fact that they allow an investor to profit from an
individual’s death does not distinguish them from annuities. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a
Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 41 (2007).
80
Again, the classification depends on what the effect of the foregone proceeds would have been. See
supra note 77.
81
Tontines, named for Lorenzo de Tonti, have taken a variety of forms throughout history but always
grant their shareholders some benefit by virtue of survival. See, e.g., Kent McKeever, A Short History of
Tontines (2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340062. In its most dramatic incarnation, group
members contributed to a fund that went to the last individual to survive. Id. at 1; Baker & Siegelman,
supra at 7; see also ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE WRONG BOX (1889). A form of tontine life insurance
that paid out for survival as well as for death evolved in the United States in the 19th century. See
McKeever, supra at 12-15; Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Enticing Low Risks into the Health Insurance
Pool: Tontines for the Invincibles and Other Ideas from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, U
Pa. Law School Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-07 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350423, at 3, 5-7. Baker and Siegelman propose adapting the tontines idea of
deferred dividends to the health insurance arena. See generally Baker & Siegelman, supra.
82
See, e.g., BBC News, Dying Man Wins Bet He Would Live, May 30, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/8075288.stm; Rachael Emma Silverman,
Letting an Investor Bet on When You’ll Die, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005.
83
Croley and Hanson, supra note 3, at 1885; see also id. n.367 (discussing variations on this idea,
including an annuity that pays out only if the child survives to the age of 18).
84
See id. at 1885.
85
See text accompanying notes 23-29, supra; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1885
(suggesting that the unavailability of markets in this form of disinsurance offers some evidence that parents
prefer the implicit insurance against the death of a child that inheres in the cost savings accruing to parents
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B. Legal Claims and Liabilities
1. Selling (and Settling) Legal Claims
Legal claims are effectively sold whenever the parties to a lawsuit (or potential
lawsuit) settle among themselves; for plaintiffs, these transactions typically combine cells
I and IV by simultaneously truncating upside and downside risk. Liability waivers, which
may be viewed as combining cells II and IV,86 also represent a familiar (if often legally
unavailable) vehicle for reversing tort law’s default risk allocation between potential
injurers and potential victims.87 But legal risks could also be addressed through REVEs
that involve third parties and that encompass transactions that occur prior to any point of
injury or exposure.88 For example, a number of scholars have advocated markets in
“unmatured” tort claims.89 These proposals contemplate the sale of potential claims to
third parties who would be entitled to collect on behalf of the victim in the event he is
injured.90 Advocates of markets in unmatured tort claims have typically prescribed
specific limits on these transactions, such as a requirement that would-be victims first
secure adequate first-party insurance.91 The initial sale of the tort claim would combine
following such a death).
86
See text accompanying supra note 49.
87
For discussion of liability waivers and the legal limitations on them, see, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld,
The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
No. 09-25 (April 2009), at 20-21 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396377; Note, Enforcing Waivers in
Products Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111 (1983); Richard C. Ausness, “Waive” Goodbye to Tort Liability:
A Proposal to Remove Paternalism, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (2000).
88
Transactions could also occur between the point of exposure and the manifestation of harm. See Yair
Listokin and Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1435, 1474-75 & n.183 (2004) (discussing asbestos exposure as presenting “inchoate claims,” the
settlement of which would constitute a form of “anti-insurance”); see also Ariel Porat & Alex Stein,
Liability for Future Harms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION (Richard S. Goldberg, ed., forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457362, manuscript at 26-27 (proposing that victims be allowed to
choose compensation for future harm over compensation for realized harm, in part because this would
enable them to make use of money in a state of the world where they are healthy).
89
See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 4; Robert Cooter & Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market
in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (Walter
Olsen ed., 1988); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 202-10 (1989). For critiques, see,
e.g., Alan Schwartz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": A Long Way Yet to
Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423 (1989); Charles J. Goetz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims": Collateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REV. 413 (1989).
90
This does not necessarily mean that the purchaser would actually end up pursuing a claim if an
injury later occurred. For example, some proposals contemplate that the unmatured claims would be
purchased by employers and resold in blocks to potential injurers and their insurers, thus “presettling” large
numbers of potential claims. See SUGARMAN, supra note 89, at 202-03; Cooter & Sugarman, supra note 89,
at 176; see also O’Connell, supra note 4, at 699-700 (observing that if two parties owned a number of
claims against each other, they could settle them all in a single “bulk settlement”).
91
See SUGARMAN, supra note 89, at 204; Cooter & Sugarman, supra note 89, at 178; Cooter, supra
note 4, at 401-02. An earlier proposal by Jeffrey O’Connell framed the sale of unmatured tort claims as a
way to finance first-party no-fault insurance. Jeffrey O’Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective
First-Party No-Fault Insurance Financed by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 693 (1978);
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cells II and IV, while the purchase of first-party insurance would undo the cell II
component through a cell I move.
Although scholarship on unmatured tort claims focuses on transactions involving
potential plaintiffs, it would also be possible for potential defendants to engage in parallel
transactions from a baseline in which they are shielded from liability. Suppose that the
law placed losses by default not on specific injurers, but instead spread the risk of loss
more broadly through a social insurance system funded by contributions from all
potential injurers.92 In such a regime, a potential injurer might wish to make a deal in
which it receives from the social insurer (or a third party reverse insurer) a payment equal
to the expected value of the injuries it will cause, agreeing in exchange to pay an amount
equal to the losses that it (the potential injurer) actually ends up inflicting on the victim.93
This would be a cell II move.
After the event giving rise to liability occurs and a “matured” legal claim exists,
litigation risk remains that both plaintiffs and defendants might transact over with third
parties.94 REVEs might also occur after final judgment to alter the risk allocation
embedded in the relief awarded, as explained below.
2. Tort Remedies
The use of damages to remedy a nuisance represents an interesting example of a risk
allocation embedded within a legal outcome. Suppose that the law entitles a homeowner
to be free of smoke emanating from a neighboring factory, but protects that entitlement
only with a liability rule.95 If we assume (as is typically the case) that stochastic factors
determine whether and to what extent the emissions of the factory translate into realized
harm for the homeowner, then risk is allocated differently if the homeowner is

see also Jeffrey O’Connell & Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort
Claims as a Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. 55 (1980). Insurance
subrogation represents a existing, limited way in which certain tort claim rights are transferred in exchange
for less expensive first-party insurance covering the same risks. I thank Frank Easterbrook for raising this
point.
92
New Zealand’s system fits this model. A government agency, the Accident Compensation
Corporation, provides “no fault” coverage to accident victims, drawing on accounts funded by various
taxes and levies. See http://www.acc.co.nz/index.htm; Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 187 (2008).
93
Like reverse insurance procured by potential victims in a regime that holds injurers liable, this
arrangement produces exposure for both parties. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 225; text
accompanying notes 38-44, infra.
94
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005);
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); Jonathan D. Glater,
Investing in Lawsuits, for a Share of the Awards, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009. The sale of a matured legal
claim, which involves shifting the risk associated with pursuing that claim, must be distinguished from the
sale of a right to a future stream of income (“factoring”) in a structured settlement of a claim. See, e.g.,
Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV.
859, 899-99 (describing these transactions).
95
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092, 1115-16.
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compensated for realized harm than if she is compensated ex ante for expected harm.96
If we start with a legal regime that permits the homeowner to collect based on
realized harm, allowing her to opt instead for an upfront payment of permanent damages
represents an event-detracting move that detaches compensation from the realization of
harm (cell II). Conversely, the defendant purchases an event enhancement by detaching
liability from an otherwise covered event (cell I). Alternatively, a legal regime might
begin at this endpoint, with permanent damages as the default remedy. In that case, the
defendant might take on risk (cell II) either by selling coverage directly to the plaintiff97
or by negotiating with a third party reverse insurer. Similarly, the plaintiff might shed risk
in such a world (cell I) by purchasing coverage either directly from the defendant or from
an insurer. If the conferral of positive externalities could give rise to liability,98 cell III
and IV transactions paralleling those detailed above could likewise rearrange the law’s
default allocation of upside risk.99
3. Legal Changes
We might expect people to be interested in insuring against or hedging legal changes
that would significantly affect their lives. Prediction markets keyed to tax law changes
and other legislative changes have already emerged.100 Scholarship has also examined the
potential for private insurance against governmental takings.101 Policies offered by the
World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency represent another tool
for managing the risk of legal change, insuring investors against certain governmental
acts and omissions, as well as war and civil unrest.102 To the extent the change in
96

See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1468-69 (2007).
“Selling coverage” in this context means that the defendant retains the permanent damages that she
would otherwise pay to the plaintiff and agrees in exchange to cover any actual harm from her activities
that materializes.
98
A recent paper detailing the existing limits on liability for unrequested benefits and proposing an
“expanded duty of restitution” is Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for
Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009).
99
Suppose a legal regime makes neighbor A liable for part of the cost of a fence constructed by
neighbor B if that fence bestows benefits on A. That liability might be operationalized in either of the
following ways: (1) neighbor A might be required to pay when an appraisal upon resale establishes that
value has been added, or (2) A might be required to pay upfront for the expected value added. The former
arrangement leaves on B the risk that the benefits will not materialize, while the latter places that risk on A.
Either arrangement could be reversed using cell III and IV REVEs.
100
See Intrade Predictions Markets, http://www.intrade.com (listing contracts for changes in U.S. tax
rates and for the establishment of a cap and trade system); see also Posting of Jason Ruspini to Risk
Markets and Politics, http://riskmarkets.blogspot.com/2008/02/tax-futures-reality.html (Feb. 6, 2008,
23:55).
101
See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO. ST. L.J. 451, 499-521 (2003); Eric
Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A Torts Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235
(1994); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986).
102
Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency: Types of Coverage,
http://www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm?stid=1547 (offering insurance against “expropriation”
97
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question is one that will have a negative financial impact on the individual seeking
insurance, the transaction falls within cell I. It would also be possible for people to
increase upside risk by betting on changes that will not affect them at all, or that will
benefit them (cell III moves). Alternatively, where uncertain legal changes would have a
positive effect, that effect could be dampened by selling rights to part or all of that
potential gain (cell IV).
Transition relief (such as grandfathering, the recognition of vested rights, or
compensation for governmental takings) amounts to embedded insurance against legal
change.103 Following the logic of unbundling, some people might wish to shed the
implicit insurance provided by the law by receiving the expected value equivalent of that
relief from the government up front (perhaps in the form of lower taxes or less onerous
land use exactions) in exchange for greater exposure to the effects of future legal
changes.104 This would represent a cell II transaction, assuming the legal change would in
fact inflict losses.
C. Homes
1. Housing Futures and Options
By default, the law leaves homeowners exposed to volatility in home values, most of
which is governed by factors beyond their personal control. As a growing number of
scholars, policymakers, and entrepreneurs have observed, many homeowners could
benefit from offloading some of this risk.105 There is both an upside and downside
component of home value variance, as measured against the baseline of the original sales
price, and each component could be separately adjusted. First, a homeowning household
could purchase protection against downward price movements in the local housing
market.106 This would be a cell I REVE that works like ordinary first-party insurance—
(including “creeping expropriation”), governmental acts or omissions that make it impossible to convert or
transfer currency, and losses from “war, terrorism, and civil disturbance”). I thank Nicole Garnett for
alerting me to these policies.
103
See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 40-42 (2000); Kaplow, supra note 101, at 52728; Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 569, 571-72 (1984); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics
of Transition Relief, NYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
104
For example, a number of scholars have noted that the government could pay landowners for
“takings options” that would permit the government to condemn the land without paying just
compensation. See, e.g., William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 274 (1988)
(describing and citing antecedent literature on this possibility).
105
For an overview of past, proposed, and existing programs and products for rearranging
homeownership risk, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047
(2008).
106
See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19 J. Real Estate Fin. &
Econ. 21 (1999); Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin.,
Working Paper No. 03-12, May 3, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=410141; Maureen A.
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the homeowner pays out the expected value of any loss of home value attributable to
downward market fluctuations and receives in exchange the right to an amount that will
cover this loss in the event of such fluctuations.
Alternatively, or in addition, a household could sell the right to upside home
appreciation. This event-detracting REVE could be characterized as a cell IV transaction
involving “gravy”—rights to a gain—if the original sales price serves as the baseline. Of
course, it is possible to frame things differently. If the homeowner will need to purchase
other housing upon resale of the current house, we could characterize that need as a
liability and potential price increases in that other housing as potential reductions in the
homeowner's standard of living.107 If the homeowner’s future housing and present
housing experience closely correlated price movements, then the appreciation realized on
the present house looks something like an insurance payment designed to cover the
threatened loss associated with price increases in future housing.108 Selling the home's
upside potential in this context would seem more like selling an insurance claim and
accepting exposure (cell II).
2. Rental Price Insurance
Because tenants lack an equity stake in the properties in which they live, rising
property values can lead to affordability shortfalls as rents rise. While the empirical
record on the extent of involuntary displacement is complex and contested,109 there is
little doubt that fear of displacement and rising rental costs generate disutility, both for
tenants and for others in their communities.110 These concerns would disappear if tenants
could obtain what homeowners already have—an option to remain in place as long as
they like at a fixed price.111 Lengthy leases are one possibility, but these are costly for
McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78
NW. U. L. REV. 1463 (1984).
107
Sinai & Souleles, supra note 8, at 763 (observing that “all households are in effect born ‘short’
housing services, since they have to live somewhere”).
108
See Todd M. Sinai and Nicholas S. Souleles, Can Owning a Home Hedge the Risk of Moving?
(October 2009), NBER Working Paper No. w15462, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498963 at 2-3
(finding that households “tend to move between highly covarying housing markets” which makes the
purchase of the first home work as an effective hedge against the second home); Sinai & Souleles, supra
note 8, at 763-64.
109
For example, compare Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement, New
York City in the 1990’s, 70 J. AM. PLANNING ASSOC. 39 (2004) with Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The
Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URBAN
STUD. 23 (2006).
110
See, e.g., Freeman & Braconi, supra note 109, at 39-40; Newman & Wyly, supra note 109, at 3031.
111
On the importance to tenants of the right to remain, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent
Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359–63, 368–70 (1986); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to
Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86
N.C. L. REV. 817, 820-29 (2008). The contrast between the situations of tenants and homeowners,
respectively, is often less stark than the statement in the text might suggest. For example, tenants in many
localities enjoy some protection against displacement, while some mortgage products, such as those with
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landlords to offer and often unattractive to tenants who want to retain the option to leave
if they so choose. Some scholars have suggested that tenants be afforded access to
financial options indexed to area rents.112 Under such a plan, if rents rose, so too would
the value of the option held by the tenant, who could then afford the new, higher rent.113
Tenants would thus be effectively insured against increased rents.114 These options would
amount to cell I REVEs, albeit ones that a third party governmental entity might fund or
subsidize.115
It is also worth observing that rent control delivers a form of legally embedded rental
price insurance that is tied to the household’s specific unit. Recognizing this equivalence
opens up the possibility that some tenants in rent-controlled units might wish to sell their
implicit insurance, receiving a lump sum in exchange for greater exposure to changes in
local rental rates (a cell II transaction).116
D. Livelihoods and Human Capital
1. Equity Shares in Future Earnings
Minor league baseball player Randy Newsom made the news in 2008 (and attracted
unwanted regulatory attention from the SEC) by setting up a website to sell shares of his
future major league earnings.117 A writer recently tried a similar tactic,118 and one might
imagine the idea taking hold more broadly, were it not for regulatory hurdles.119 Even
adjustable rates, undermine the usual price protection associated with homeownership.
112
See BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 369 (2005); Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary
McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement while Protecting Low-Income Families, The Urban
Institute, Opportunity and Ownership Project, No. 8 (May 2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html; Robert I. Lerman, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement
While Protected Low-Income Families, prepared for presentation at the 29th Research Conference
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Nov. 8, 2009 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors); see also Lee Anne Fennell & Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452887 (proposing that local governments make
such options available to tenants).
113
See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 112; Lerman supra note 112.
114
Although one incarnation of the proposal would envision the use of call options to deliver
protection, the program could instead be explicitly structured as an insurance program. See Lerman &
McKernan, supra note 112, at 2; Lerman supra note 112, at 7-8.
115
For example, local governments might subsidize such financial instruments or provide them free of
charge to low-income tenants. See, e.g., Lerman & McKernan, supra note 112.
116
See Radin, supra note 111, at 359-60 n.12 (observing that “[t]here could also be tenants who would
value the money they might get by ‘selling’ back to the landlord their rent-control rights more than they
value a right to keep their apartments,” but noting that actual rent control programs do not allow tenants to
waive their rent control rights in exchange for a lower initial rent).
117
See Alan Schwarz, Buying Low: Minor Leaguer Takes Stock of Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 1, 2008.
Newsom tabled his plan, see id., and is now attending law school at Boston College. See
http://randynewsom.com/2009/08/26/tetanus-shots-law-school-anxieties-and-baseball-road-trips/.
118
See Posting to Freakonomics, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/when-a-novelistholds-an-ipo/ (Aug. 1, 2008, 13:02).
119
See, e.g., Posting of Christine Hurt to Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/08/onemore-time-s.html (Aug. 5, 2008) (discussing regulatory issues). A number of non-U.S. companies,
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people who have regular salaries might want to sell a proportion of the proceeds from a
bonus, award, or promotion they stand some chance of receiving. For example, an
academic who is widely viewed as standing a significant chance of winning the Nobel
Prize might alienate the right to the proceeds from that prize in exchange for a sum
certain.120 These would represent cell IV transactions.
Although the idea of selling stock in oneself seems novel, it closely resembles
familiar arrangements. Many firms heavily rely on equity financing, and one might well
ask why individuals should not be able to do the same.121 Another parallel is found in
recording or publishing contracts. There, a record company or a book publisher pays a
lump sum to an artist or author in exchange for rights to most of the returns from specific
creative works that may or may not have yet been produced. In these cases as well, there
is great uncertainty surrounding the future payoff from an activity, and the artist
effectively sells much of the upside potential in exchange for a sure gain now. That sure
gain is paid partly in the form of an advance, which may help provide the up-front
support necessary to create the work in question, and partly through the in-kind provision
of production and publicity services. To the extent that new media distribution, publicity,
and reputation-building channels opened up by the internet make the in-kind component
easier for artists to supply or contract for on their own, we might expect to see more
artists interested in selling equity shares on their own.122
Liquidity needs are an important impetus for some of these REVEs, given that people
are often unable to borrow against their own future earnings.123 This raises the question
including UK-based Bandstocks and SlicethePie, and Amsterdam-based Sellaband, allow fans to invest in
bands through their websites in exchange for specified benefits, including shares of the bands’ future
income.
See
Bandstocks,
How
It
Works:
One
Minute
Version
for
Investors,
http://www.bandstocks.com/Page.htm?action=HowItWorksInvestor; SlicethePie, Investor,
http://www.slicethepie.com/About/Investor.aspx; Sellaband, How It Works,
http://www.sellaband.com/pages/how_it_works. Selling equity rights to an uncertain future income stream
can be distinguished from using a known future income stream to secure a bond. A number of athletes,
including White Sox player Frank Thomas, have attempted to securitize guaranteed future income streams
as a way of raising money. See GIL FRIED ET AL., SPORT FINANCE 178 (2008). “Bowie Bonds” represented
a similar effort at securitization, albeit one based on an income stream that proved fickle. See Karen
Richardson, Bankers Hope for a Reprise of “Bowie Bonds,” WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2005.
120
Nobel prospects have already figured in divorce settlements. See, e.g., Jason English, Odd Facts
About Nobel Prize Winners, CNN.com, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/10/06/mf.nobel.odd.facts/index.html. Betting markets in
Nobel prospects have also developed. For example, both of this year’s winners of the Nobel prize in
economics (Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson) were given 50/1 odds by one UK-based betting site,
Ladbrokes. See Post to Greg Mankiw’s Blog, http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/10/nobel-odds.html
(Oct. 8, 2009) (citing Ladbrokes).
121
Cf. Andrew Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and Homeownership,
18 Hous. Pol’y Debate 209, 217 (2007) (observing that shared equity mortgages would permit homeowners
to use equity to finance their homes, as well as debt).
122
See, e.g., Owen Gibson, Don’t Just Buy the Music, Fans Told—Now You Can Invest in Big Names
of the Future, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 27, 2008 (reporting on Bandstocks, discussed at supra note 119).
123
Human capital cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and default is a serious concern. For
discussion and critique of limits on the alienability of human capital, see generally Stewart E. Sterk,
Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993).
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of whether risk rearrangement is the best response to the liquidity crunch, or whether
changes in lending practices would be preferable.124 In other cases, risk buffering appears
to be the dominant motive. Professional athletes with frontloaded earning profiles, for
example, may be much more interested in hedging career-ending injuries than in
generating extra liquidity.125 Another alternative, of course, would be for athletes to
expressly insure against the injury itself, a garden-variety cell I transaction.
It would also be possible for people to “anti-insure” future income increases, whether
to intensify their own incentives or to signal a high level of confidence.126 For example,
an individual worker could pay the expected value of a possible future bonus to a reverse
insurer who agrees to match the bonus if the worker in fact receives it (a cell III
transaction).127
2. Livelihood and Income Insurance
Robert Shiller has proposed that people be able to hedge against changes in the
profitability of a chosen profession, such as a particular scientific subspecialty.128 His
approach contemplates payouts based in part on indexes that capture trends within
different fields rather solely on a given individual’s career trajectory.129 Robert Hockett
has similarly advocated a significant expansion in the risk management opportunities
extended to workers and business owners, using a suite of hedging instruments based on
economic and social indicators.130 Another set of proposals involves tying student loan
repayment obligations to future earnings in various ways.131 Other sorts of private
124

For example, student loans represent one way in which people can effectively borrow against future
earnings, and one that was historically facilitated by governmental involvement in guaranteeing loans. See,
e.g., Hockett, supra note 1, at 927-30. For discussion of loan products that blend risk rearrangement with
liquidity, see text accompanying note 131, infra.
125
Similarly, college athletes might be persuaded to delay entering the draft by insurance against the
effect of injuries on their professional prospects, even though colleges are restricted from providing them
with upfront cash payments. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, Hell No, Don’t Let Them Go!
CHI. TRIB., May 8, 2008.
126
See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 218-21 (describing “anti-insurance for gains”) For more on the
signaling value of insurance choices, see infra note 227.
127
See Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 218-21 (explaining how incentives could be amplified in this
manner through side deals with anti-insurers).
128
SHILLER, supra note 2, at 107-13; see Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1272-78 (2005) (discussing
Shiller's proposal).
129
See SHILLER, supra note 2, at 112-13.
130
Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity,
Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a
"New Economy, "25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 214-26 (2004).
131
The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 provides limited risk-buffering by tying
repayment schedules to earnings for most federally guaranteed loans and providing loan forgiveness after
ten years of payments for those engaged in certain kinds of public service or public interest careers (others
can receive loan forgiveness after twenty-five years). Pub. Law No. 110-84, titles II & IV. President Obama
recently proposed an expansion of this approach that would cap student loan repayments at ten percent of
the amount by which earnings exceed 150% of the federal poverty level and that would provide loan
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unemployment or “salary-gap” insurance have also been attempted, albeit with limited
success.132 Publicly provided unemployment insurance and means-tested social welfare
benefits represent embedded mechanisms for buffering downside income and
employment risk, and ones that are justified in part by difficulties sustaining private
markets in these types of insurance.133 These alternatives all fall within cell I’s domain of
reducing downside risk, at least insofar as continued employment and past returns to a
profession represent the operative baselines.
3. Reverse-Insuring Poverty and Unemployment
People might also wish to engage in REVEs that involve ceding future claims against
the social safety net in exchange for expected value payments—a form of cell II reverse
insurance against poverty or unemployment. For reasons that will be examined further
below, such exchanges are generally viewed as problematic.134 Nonetheless, a small-scale
version of reverse insurance is quietly dispensed through many state welfare programs:
families with acute, short-term needs can elect to receive a one-time lump sum payment
in exchange for forgoing the right to seek regular monthly benefit payments under the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program for some period of time.135
While such families are already suffering from a covered event under the social insurance
scheme (poverty), the full extent and impact of the event is typically unknown at the time
of the election. After receiving the cash payment, the family must bear whatever losses
eventuate during the period in which they are precluded from seeking TANF benefits.136
To take another example, consider the fact that some jobs come with a form of
implicit insurance against termination except for limited reasons. The tenure protection
forgiveness after twenty years. See David K. Randall, Obama Plans to Cut Student Loan Payments,
FORBES.COM, Jan. 25, 2010; see also Ron Lieber, Aid for Students Facing Mountain of Debt, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 2009 (reviewing past proposals and a new innovation called “SafeStart” that would provide an
interest-free credit line to repay student loans if earnings are low in early years out of school); E.G. West,
The Yale Tuition Postponement Plan in the Mid-Seventies, 5 HIGHER ED. 169 (1976) (analyzing Yale’s
income-contingent loan program); SHILLER, supra note 2, at 139-48 (discussing “income-linked loans”).
132
See Ron Lieber, Insure Yourself Against a Job Loss? Good Luck, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2009. Private
insurance against one manifestation of unemployment is found in Hyundai’s recent “assurance” program
permitting car buyers who finance or lease their vehicles to return them upon job loss (and other specified
events) for up to a year without being responsible for up to $7,500 in negative equity. See Hyundai
Assurance, http://www.hyundaiusa.com/financing/HyundaiAssurance/HyundaiAssurance.aspx.
133
See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV.
335, 362-65 (2001) (discussing difficulties in privately insuring against unemployment).
134
See infra Part III.C.1.
135
See, e.g., GRETCHEN ROWE & MARY MURPHY, WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF
POLICIES AS OF JULY 2006 15 (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411686_welfare_databook06.pdf.
136
In some state programs, the diversion payments do not delay TANF eligibility or do so for a period
of time that is equal to or less than that in which the diversion sum would have been expended through
TANF’s monthly payments. However, other state programs delay TANF eligibility for up to two, three, or
even four times as long as the period in which an equivalent amount of monthly TANF payments would
have been made. See id. at 32-35, tbl. A.1.A.
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extended to university professors is a classic example. We could imagine undoing this
insurance through cell II transactions in which currently tenured professors accept a sum
of money in exchange for being exposed to the same risk of termination as an at-will
employee.137
E. Health and Quality of Life
Health insurance is a familiar, if often controversial, cell I REVE. Yet a number of
less conventional possibilities exist for addressing risk associated with health and other
aspects of one’s quality of life. Some of these alternatives could change the terms of the
health insurance debate in fundamental ways. One set of ideas squarely confronts the fact
that, as people move through time, they learn new information about their likely health
risks. Because it is not possible to initiate life-long coverage before important
information about health risks becomes known,138 people might wish to insure against the
higher insurance rates that such new information will produce by purchasing insurance
against future high insurance premia.139 These are standard cell I transactions, but they
reach risks that presently either go unaddressed or are approached clumsily through limits
on insurance risk classifications or exclusions.
Another set of ideas builds on the notion that money may produce less marginal
utility in the ill state than in the well state.140 For example, expensive travel may become
unenjoyable if one is suffering from a debilitating disease. Thus, someone who loves to
travel might wish to move money from the state of the world in which she is sick to the
state of the world in which she is healthy. Richard Zeckhauser describes one
manifestation of this idea—a kind of “commune” in which elderly people contribute to a
fund that is earmarked for whoever among them remains healthy enough to enjoy using
137

See, e.g., Posting of Steven D. Levitt to Freakonomics, Let’s Just Get Rid of Tenure (Including
Mine), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/lets-just-get-rid-of-tenure/ (March 3, 2007,
23:31) (stating that he would gladly give up tenure for a $15,000 salary increase).
138
As Zeckhauser notes, “even infancy is too late” to spread health risks fully; “[b]y the time a child is
born, his catastrophic health needs are determined to a substantial extent in the statistical sense.”
Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 159. It might be possible to move coverage earlier; Kyle Logue and Joel
Slemrod have suggested that parents might purchase pre-conception “genetic endowment insurance.” Kyle
Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61
NAT’L TAX J. 843, 859 (2008). But even this pre-conception insurance might come too late given the effect
of the parents’ genetic endowments on their children’s expected genetic endowments.
139
See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the Practice of
Insurance, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2004, at 21. For example, “gene insurance”
procured before genetic testing occurs would enable individuals to affordably purchase health insurance
that is accurately priced based on genetic information. See Alexander Tabarrok, Gene Insurance, in
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMICS: BRIGHT IDEAS FROM THE DISMAL SCIENCE 47 (Alexander Tabarrok, ed.,
2002); see also John H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, in ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMICS,
supra, at 53; Reed Abelson, United Health to Insure the Right to Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at
B1; Posting of Tyler Cowen to Marginal Revolution,
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/12/insurance-marke.html (Dec. 3, 2008,
10:02).
140
See, e.g., Viscusi & Evans, supra note 28.
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the money.141 This transaction spans the rows in Figure 3, giving an individual participant
a chance at more money while healthy (an event-enhancing move that might be
characterized as falling either in cell I or cell III) 142 that is funded by an event-detracting
REVE that might be characterized as falling either in cell II or cell IV).143
Many other variations are imaginable. For example, suppose a senior citizen has a
fifty percent chance of developing a mobility-impairing condition that will cause him to
prefer living in a very small one-level apartment; otherwise, he would prefer to live in a
stylish multi-level house that he cannot currently afford. An investor might enter into an
arrangement with him whereby she will cover half the cost of the multi-level home,
conditional on the senior citizen turning the home over to her as sole owner in the event
the condition develops.144 Such approaches have the interesting feature of encouraging
the production of accurate information about possible health states, since this information
offers a source of financial leverage.145
Relatedly, a REVE might address concerns about the proportion of health care dollars
spent on end-of-life health care when quality of life may be low.146 Suppose that a
screening procedure indicates that a patient has a ten percent chance of developing
condition X. If condition X develops, the patient could extend her life by roughly three
months through treatment that costs $500,000; however, she would be in significant
discomfort during most of that time. If her health insurance covers this treatment, she is
effectively holding a claim worth the present value equivalent of $50,000 in medical
treatment. Suppose the patient could trade in her claim to this expensive end-of-life
treatment at the time of screening for a payment that she can use during the disease’s
latency period, or for a payment that she (or her estate, if X develops) will enjoy at the
end of the latency period. Such an approach would constitute a form of partial reverse
141

See Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 157.
On one view, the transaction insures one against running out of funds during a period of continued
good health, when such funds are especially necessary and utility-producing. This interpretation would line
up at least roughly with cell I. The idea is analogous to that behind an annuity, where the hazard in question
is outliving one’s wealth. See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 157 (describing annuities as “anti-life
insurance”). An alternative interpretation would be that one is buying a lottery ticket that may provide an
upside payoff to augment the good luck of remaining healthy; this would line up with cell III.
143
One might view the agreement to give up funds in the event of poor health as leaving one exposed
to an unremediated ditch (cell II). However, if money is less utility-producing when one is in a state of poor
health, it may represent a form of gravy that one would rather sell off one’s rights to receive (cell IV).
144
The “housing partnerships” idea developed by Andrew Caplin and his coauthors similarly
contemplates investors going in with homeowners on their home purchases and sharing rights to equity,
although for different reasons and pursuant to different sharing rules. See generally ANDREW CAPLIN ET
AL., HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS (1997). Another
analogue is found in schemes in which an elderly individual signs over rights to a property upon her death
(in effect, selling the home subject to a reserved life estate). See Flavia Kraus-Jackson & Flavia Rotondi, In
Italy, Home Sales With a Twist, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIB., Feb. 26, 2009 (describing “nude sales” in
which ownership passes but the seller has the right to life-long occupancy).
145
Cf. Hockett, supra note 130, at 228-33.
146
Whether “too much” is spent at the end of life is a difficult question. For a recent economic analysis
of terminal care, see Tomas J. Philipson et al., The Value of Life Near Its End and Terminal Care (Oct. 30,
2009 draft), available at http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/philipson_110909.pdf.
142
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insurance that might be framed either as a cell II REVE exposing the patient to a “ditch”
(the untreated condition X) or as a cell IV REVE in which the patient cedes a form of
(unpalatable) “gravy” (the treatment for condition X).
Health is not the only aspect of well-being that might be addressed through new
REVEs. For example, family configurations carry enormous potential to alter one’s need
for, and utility from, money. Although there are obvious impediments to insuring against
events like divorce or child-bearing, some hedging might still occur in these areas,
whether through social policy or private innovations.147 On the more quotidian end of the
spectrum, betting on sports events is a familiar way to add risk to one’s life; it is also
possible that people might want to hedge utility losses by betting against their favorite
teams (a cell I transaction).148 A recently introduced cell I variation is insurance that
participants in fantasy sports leagues can purchase against injuries sustained by the
players they have selected.149 Individuals and households might ultimately be able to
hedge a broad range of risks to their well-being, from a shortage of sunny days150 to
population, income, or crime trends in their current or future communities.151
III. EFFICIENCY AND RISK CUSTOMIZATION
The discussion to this point has emphasized both the existing gaps and asymmetries
in risk markets and the growing interest among both scholars and entrepreneurs in finding
ways to fill them in. Law can take a variety of stances toward these developments, from
maintaining or toughening prohibitions on REVEs, to replacing outright bans with
liability rules,152 to loosening or lifting restrictions, to subsidizing or otherwise
facilitating the development of new risk markets, to setting up government-provided
opportunities to trade in unbundled risk.
Broadly speaking, there are three sets of costs that legal policy must take into account
147

For example, social policies that direct resources towards those raising children have the effect of
buffering some of the financial impacts of procreation. One company has announced plans to offer a
"guaranty" on marriage. SafeGuard Guaranty Corporation, Shifting a Social Paradigm,
http://www.safeguardguaranty.com/Investors3.html; see also Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring
Opinions ,http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/should_you_buy_1.html (Aug. 2, 2007)
(discussing obstacles to divorce insurance and describing SafeGuard's product as an "investment vehicle"
rather
than
insurance);
Posting
of
Robin
Hanson
to
Overcoming
Bias,
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/10/marriage-future.html (Oct. 22, 2007, 6:00) (discussing the
potential market for “marriage futures”).
148
See Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143, 149 n.14. (1977).
149
See Nando Di Fino, A New Kind of Pocket Protection, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009.
150
Weather futures have already claimed an important niche market among those in weather-sensitive
industries. See, e.g., Come Rain or Come Shine, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2007, at 78, 78–79; CME Weather
Products, http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/weather/. See also Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1796-97
(presenting a hypothetical in which people might wish to reallocate sunshine across different states of the
world).
151
See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 130, at 203-26.
152
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092.
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in deciding how much risk customization to allow or encourage.153 First are the costs
associated with a default or mandatory risk allocation that is suboptimal for at least some
interactions. Affected parties must bear either the cost of the suboptimal allocation, the
cost of altering consumption or activity choices in an effort to adjust risk obliquely, or the
cost of moving away from the default—whichever is less. Easing moves away from the
default allocation would reduce these costs, but it could also facilitate inefficient risk
shifts, whether due to mistakes, cognitive biases, or externalities. Thus, a second category
of costs is made up of mistaken or socially harmful risk reallocations from a given
starting point. A third set of costs stems not from any particular risk arrangement but
rather from heterogeneity in risk arrangements within a particular domain.
A. Is the Status Quo Optimally Unbundled?
In considering these costs and their relationship to each other and to legal policy, a
threshold question inevitably arises: has the status quo already gotten things precisely
right, so that any missing entries in the risk menu “deserve” to be missing? Here it is
useful to note that initial risk allocations may be difficult or impossible to reverse or undo
for two basic reasons. First, there may be a legal prohibition on REVEs that makes the
initial allocation a mandatory, rather than default, arrangement. Second, there may simply
be no market offering a particular REVE. Can we infer from the fact that a market is
blocked or absent that it would not be capable of producing any social gains? In
answering this question, it is tempting to treat legal blockades as different in kind and
inherently more suspect than the failure of markets to emerge in the absence of legal
prohibitions. But the existence of externalities, both positive and negative, complicates
the story, as does the possibility that people may not always be the best agents for their
own interests or preferences.
Although it is ultimately an empirical question whether and to what extent missing or
blocked markets impose net social costs on society, it is useful to work through some of
the primary considerations that bear on whether REVEs will be—or should be—
available. I will start with reasons why a presently absent risk endstate might be either
unsustainable or unattainable, notwithstanding its legal availability. I will then examine
considerations that might support a legal ban on particular REVEs. Finally, I will
consider the potential costs of heterogeneity.
B. Unsustainable or Unattainable Risk Endstates
REVEs are used to move from an existing risk allocation to a new one. If the new
153

Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-42 (2000) (examining optimal standardization in the
property context by weighing “frustration costs” to the parties of limited forms against the costs that
customization may impose on the system and on third parties).
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allocation cannot be successfully sustained over time because its costs exceed its benefits,
nothing is lost by not being able to move to it. However, the present unattainability of a
risk endstate may not signal its social worthlessness if, for example, a first-moving
entrepreneur could not capture enough of the benefits of offering the new arrangement.
1. Moral Hazard
Certain REVEs might not emerge because the underlying risk arrangements that they
bring about cannot be profitably offered due to moral hazard concerns. Moral hazard
refers to the tendency of those insured against a loss to do less to avoid that loss than they
would if they had to fully bear it.154 The problem emerges when a particular hazard or
potentiality blends together factors under a party's control with those that are not under
her control. Arrow has accordingly characterized the moral hazard problem as one of
incomplete risk definition.155 Although often kept within acceptable bounds through
measures like deductibles, copayments, coverage limitations, and monitoring,156 moral
hazard can make private insurance markets difficult or impossible to sustain in some
cases. Even if the controllable and uncontrollable aspects of a given event can be defined
in the abstract, informational and administrative difficulties may make isolation of the
“pure risk” component prohibitively costly or impracticable.157 Thus, there may be
instances in which REVEs are not feasible because the risk in question simply cannot be
unbundled from components under individual control to the degree necessary to support a
market transaction.158
Although moral hazard is a powerful consideration that bears on the viability of
markets in risk, it does not appear to be a likely explanation for the patterns of missing
REVEs observed in the real world. Significantly, REVEs can resolve as well as introduce
moral hazard problems. Most obviously, a REVE can place risk on the party best
154

See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment
Decisions, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, supra note 1, at 239, 243 (explaining that "the fact
that someone has insurance may alter his behavior so that the observed outcome is adverse to the insurer").
155
See, e.g., Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 142 (identifying the moral hazard problem as
accompanying situations where "the risk-bearer cannot completely define his risks" and in which "he only
observes a result which is a mixture of the unavoidable risk, against which he is willing to insure, and
human decision"); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, in Essays
in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, supra note 1, at 177, 202 (explaining that we would prefer that “the event
against which insurance is taken be out of the control of the individual,” but noting that “in real life this
separation can never be made perfectly”).
156
See e.g., Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 142-43.
157
For example, a potential tort victim in a strict liability regime might wish to contract with her
potential injurer to downgrade coverage to negligence only, yet this customization would be unworkable
unless courts in such regimes were willing to make negligence determinations. I thank Saul Levmore for
discussion on this point.
158
Innovation could change the cost calculation, however. See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 2 (discussing
role of index-based financial instruments in risk innovation); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How's My Driving?"
for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1726-29 (2006); see id. at 1752-54 (noting the
potential role of new forms of monitoring and information sharing in the pricing of risk).
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positioned to influence outcomes (or on more of the parties whose behavior is relevant to
the outcome) where the law’s default position fails to do so. Indeed, where insurance
produces a risk of moral hazard, reverse insurance does the opposite, reviving incentives
to take due care by exposing parties to the full effects of their risk-taking actions. Thus,
the relative dearth of reverse insurance opportunities seems to require some explanation
other than garden-variety moral hazard concerns.
David Friedman has observed that a form of “reverse moral hazard” could produce
difficulties for reverse insurance markets despite the social efficiency of the added
care.159 Friedman explains that people who sell their claims will take additional
precautions that, albeit socially desirable, lower the value of the claim to the buyer below
the value demanded by the seller, “which may prevent the sale.”160 To see his point,
consider a potential tort victim, Vera, who sells her unmatured claim. Because of the
implicit insurance provided by the tort system, Vera begins with an entitlement package
that effectively permits her to indulge in some degree of moral hazard. Once Vera sells
her claim and will have to bear her own actual losses, however, she will take optimal, not
suboptimal, precautions. Knowing this, a third party reverse insurer will price the claim
based on optimal precaution levels, giving Vera nothing for her added precaution costs.
Of course, the potential injurer in the story (who will have to compensate the reverse
insurer in the case of a loss) benefits from Vera’s changes in care levels, and thus should
be willing to kick in an additional portion to subsidize the sale. But the added transaction
costs associated with arranging this side payment may keep the deal from occurring.161
Interestingly, it is precisely where the gains from reverse insurance are the greatest
(that is, where the moral hazard problem that would be relieved is the largest) that this
phenomenon would drive the largest wedge between what the person selling a claim
would be asked to give up and what the person buying the claim would be willing to pay.
Because the potential social gains would be so great in that context, mechanisms for
lowering transaction costs might prove worthwhile if they could be devised. Devising
them could implicate another issue that has broader significance in risk markets—
innovation costs expended on gains that might not be fully realized by the innovator.
2. Innovation Costs
Developing new risk management products requires significant up-front expenditures
on research and marketing, but may fail to produce the hoped-for returns. There may be
substantial uncertainty about whether demand exists for such a product and whether it
will pass legal muster.162 In other words, designing a REVE is itself a risky enterprise.
159

Friedman, supra note 29, at 93, n. 12 (describing the potential for “reverse moral hazard” to impede
reverse insurance markets).
160
See id.
161
See id. at 91.
162
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008).
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Even if the risk pays off and a new REVE is successful, the ability of others to quickly
copy the successful business model will diminish the returns to the innovation.163 If this
factor is important in explaining missing REVEs markets, innovation could be
encouraged through subsidies offered ex ante164 or through intellectual property
protections provided ex post.165
3. Switching, Searching, and Social Norms
Additional barriers to REVEs might include search costs,166 switching costs,167 and
social norms. For example, people may feel pressure to configure risk similarly to others
in their reference group. This could raise the cost of switching to an unconventional
alternative. In addition, certain unfamiliar risk-shifting arrangements may generate
visceral distaste.168 Such factors are potentially malleable,169 but they may nonetheless
reduce the demand for certain REVEs or raise the reputational cost of offering them.170
The same factors that can impede the spread of REVEs may support their adoption
under certain circumstances. For example, scholarship examining decisions to obtain or
do without flood insurance and earthquake insurance suggests a quite significant role for
word-of-mouth communications about insurance purchases.171 These contacts may not
only lower search costs, but may also help establish and communicate social norms about
163

In this respect, risk innovation resembles a public good that we might expect the private market to
underprovide, given the positive externalities it generates. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS:
CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 207-08 (1993).
164
See, e.g., id. at 208.
165
See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 162, at 366-71.
166
The more difficult it is to learn about an alternative to the status quo, or the less “available” to the
would-be consumer are the concerns to which that alternative responds, the less likely she will be to engage
in a REVE. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL’Y
227 (1976) (observing that people in flood- and earthquake-prone areas often lack awareness of the relevant
risks and of the availability and cost of insurance); Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 39-42 (discussing the
role of mental “availability” of risks in a variety of insurance contexts).
167
Switching from one risk arrangement to another may induce regret if it turns out badly; knowing
this, people may avoid change. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of
Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 340 (1986). For an examination of the potential effect of anticipated
regret on new markets in housing risk, see Robert J. Shiller, Derivatives Markets for Home Prices (NBER
Working Paper No. 13,962, April 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13962.pdf, at 17–20.
168
Bets that involve life and death seem to produce especially strong reactions, and markets in
everything from life insurance to predictions of terrorism risks have been affected. See, e.g., Roth, supra
note 79, at 41-42; Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of Information, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 715, 732-33 (2004) (reviewing SHILLER, supra note 2).
169
See Roth, supra note 79, at 38 (observing that transactions may be considered “repugnant in some
times and places and not in others.”); see id. at 39, tbl. 1. The distaste associated with some kinds of
REVEs may ultimately prove transient. See, e.g., id. at 41 (observing that life insurance “seems to have had
to overcome initial repugnance in the early 1800s”).
170
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2040
(1996) (suggesting that people’s reluctance to insure against certain losses could be a function of social
norms).
171
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 76-77.
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insurance.172 Given the potential effects of learning and interdependence in choices, it is
difficult to infer from the absence of a REVE market that one would ultimately prove
unsuccessful.
4. Framing
Finally, framing effects may cause individual actors or even society as a whole to
reject alternatives simply because they involve moves in an unaccustomed direction. For
example, allowing people to shed insurance coverage that is embedded in the existing tort
regime (such as that covering pain and suffering) may seem highly suspect until we
imagine a world in which that coverage is not provided and ask whether we would want
to force everyone to buy it anew.173 Similarly, risks that are currently part of standard
legal bundles, such as the housing market volatility that accompanies homeownership,
may be unthinkingly accepted. Shedding that risk seems odd—at least until one asks
whether, given the choice, one would buy shares anew that deliver payouts based on
factors like the actions of one's local government, changes in the regional labor market,
and the movement of national economic indicators.174
Seeing REVEs in action can encourage people to ask such “repurchase” questions. If
unbundled risk transactions become more commonplace and the frame-flipping that they
encourage becomes more reflexive, we might see advances in how people think about
risk-bearing. Risk allocations that now appear as simply part of the background condition
against which decisions are made will become visible as conscious choices that could be
otherwise. This argument suggests that widespread private risk trading could have some
characteristics of a public good, to the extent it helps to build a culture in which the riskbearing characteristics of situations are noticed and actively considered. Put differently, it
raises the intriguing possibility that lack of interest in some REVEs is largely a product of
existing arrangements—a failure of imagination rather than well-informed disinterest.175
172

See, e.g., id. at 77 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996); id. at 96. Part of these peer effects may relate to predictions about how forthcoming outside
assistance will be in the event of a loss; the more unusual it is to be uninsured, the less likely one might
judge such assistance. Id. at 96.
173
While there may be some people who would value such coverage, there is reason to believe that
many others would not. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from
Tort Law? More Experimental Evidence, 55 TORONTO L. REV. 941 (2005) (reviewing past literature and
presenting new empirical findings on whether people would actually choose to insure against such pain and
suffering in a world without tort law); Cooter, supra note 4, at 388-94; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 364-67.
174
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 (2001)
(analogizing the purchase of a home to the purchase of undiversified stock in the local housing market).
175
See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 1, at 946-47 (suggesting factors such of lack of imagination and
inertia may explain missing markets in risk); Hockett supra note 130, at 218 (observing in the context of
risk markets that “[t]he imaginative space in which demands are formed is itself in part a function of what
is already supplied”); Robert J. Shiller, Radical Financial Innovation, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION,
AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES 306, 320 (Eytan Sheshinski, Robert
J. Strom & William Baumol eds., 2007) (noting psychological barriers to the adoption of new risk
management mechanisms and suggesting that innovative framing could over come them). This explanation
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C. Socially Costly REVEs
In some cases REVEs are unavailable due to legal prohibitions. To the extent that
these prohibitions are binding (that is, they block transactions that would otherwise
occur) we might expect the justification to lie in unaccounted-for costs placed on parties
other than those directly engaged in the transaction or, perhaps, on temporal selves that
are not well-represented in the transaction. Examining externalities and internalities in the
context of risk transactions will enable us to consider how well these concerns map onto
existing legal prohibitions.
1. Externalities
In some cases, a party who purports to accept a given risk can actually offload part or
all of any resulting loss on others.176 Consider, for example, insurance requirements
designed to counter the problem of judgment-proof defendants.177 A tortfeasor’s choice to
do without insurance, where she is otherwise unable to pay for the damage she does,
shifts the loss to another party. Similarly, because the need to resort to social insurance
can often be reduced by purchasing or retaining other forms of insurance, the decision to
go without insurance (or to give up one’s coverage for an expected value payment) can
impose externalities on others.178 The government, as insurer of last resort, has an interest
in precluding risk taking that would be expected to increase its losses. Just as private
insurers might mandate deadbolts or fire extinguishers to avoid losses, the government
might specify the purchase and use of certain insurance products.
Moreover, given society’s normative commitment to provide some baseline of
support, people are not permitted to “cash out” the expected value of their future social
insurance payments.179 Thus, people are legally precluded from taking on downside risk
that would cut into their very basic subsistence needs. If society wishes to provide
insurance against such risks in kind, the claim to those benefits must be made inalienable.
relates in obvious ways to the costs and risks of innovation, discussed infra in Part III.B.2.
176
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 58-59 (explaining that because "often the individual does not
have to bear all the costs that result if he chooses to leave losses uninsured" it may be socially desirable to
compel certain forms of insurance).
177
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 58-59; Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Intl.
Rev. L. Econ. 45, 54 (1986); Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem,
18 Intl. Rev. L. Econ. 141, 143-44 (1998); see also Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and
Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, NBER Working Paper No.
10341, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10341 (2004).
178
To the extent that social insurance increases the tendency to do without private insurance, the
problem is one of moral hazard. See supra Part III.A.B.1.
179
See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (“The right of any person to any future payment
under this title shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or
payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”). See also David Andolfatto,
A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights, 110 J. POLIT. ECON. 382, 383-84 (2002); supra Part II.D.3
(discussing the general prohibition on alienating claims to social insurance and some limited exceptions).
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The provision of some baseline level of social insurance does not, however, explain why
claims to payoffs that exceed that level should not be alienable.
Other laws preclude debtors from accepting the full risk of default. For example,
personal bankruptcy laws require creditors to retain some of the risk associated with a
debtor's enterprises.180 Similarly, laws forbidding recourse against a homeowner's other
assets in the event of foreclosure can cause losses associated with downward home price
movements to fall on parties other than homebuyers.181 These laws precluding complete
risk-bearing are presumably designed to avoid the societal spillovers that would result
from leaving debtors fully exposed to loss.182 One such externality might be the debtor's
eligibility for various forms of social insurance—protection necessary, in turn, to avoid
the externalities associated with unalleviated poverty.183 Of course, the bankruptcy laws
themselves impose spillovers on other parties—not the creditors, who can price in the
risk that the law forces them to bear, but the nondefaulting debtors who must pay more
for credit (or suffer from reduced credit availability) as a result. The rules surrounding
bankruptcy discharge and similar protections must strike a balance between these types of
spillovers.184
Negative spillovers (externalized losses) are often cited as a reason for blocking
REVEs, but positive spillovers (externalized gains) may also be relevant. The discharge
of debt in bankruptcy again offers an interesting example. Empirical work supports the
theoretical claim that the U.S. personal bankruptcy system encourages higher levels of
entrepreneurship than would exist in the absence of such a system.185 Making REVEs that
180

See Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 139-40 (noting that under an arrangement like bankruptcy
protection and limited liability "[t]he law in effect requires creditors to assume some of the risks of the
debtor; it does not leave him free to negotiate a risk-free investment, and it provides for an inalienable
limitation of risks to the debtor"); see also MOSS supra note 1, at 123-51 (examining bankruptcy’s role as a
risk-shifting mechanism).
181
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (2009) (discussing state antideficiency laws and their effect on default choices).
182
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1418-24
(1985) (detailing a variety of externalities that would flow from debt in the absence of debtor discharge).
Internalities may also play a role. See infra Part III.C.2; Jackson, supra at 1394 (hypothesizing "that most
people would choose to retain a nonwaivable right of discharge if they knew of the psychological factors
that tempt them to overconsume credit").
183
See Jackson, supra note 182, at 1401-04. As Jackson notes, this argument would only justify
inalienable protection up to the level of support that social insurance would provide, not the far more
extensive inalienable protections available under bankruptcy law. Id. at 1403. For a broader discussion of
the relationship between bankruptcy and other forms of social insurance, see e.g., Adam Feibelman,
Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129
(2005); Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 350-60.
184
See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Consumer Bankruptcy Reform under 'BAPCPA,'
18-19 ÉCONOMIE PUBLIQUE 3, 5 (2006) (explaining that bankruptcy law "balances conflicting objectives of
helping debtors in financial distress versus promoting credit availability by protecting creditors"); id. at 17
(noting the impact of greater protections for debtors on credit price and availability).
185
See Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity,
46 J. LAW & ECON. 543 (2003) (developing a theoretical model for, and empirically testing, the relationship
between the size of the bankruptcy exemption and entrepreneurship levels); see also F.H. Buckley, The
Debtor as Victim (book review of TERESA SULLIVAN, ET.AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
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would undo this protection unavailable does not force people to become entrepreneurs,
but it helps keep down the cost of doing so.186
2. Internalities
While externalities are unaccounted-for spillovers on other parties, “internalities”
involve unaccounted-for spillovers on other temporal selves.187 If some kinds of REVEs
seem especially likely to compromise parties’ own long-run interests, the law might step
in with bans or other mechanisms designed to control these effects.188 For example, some
REVEs would involve forgoing future payoffs in exchange for immediate lump sums.
This might raise a concern if we think that people tend to be both myopic and prone to
overvalue lump sums (whenever received) relative to streams of payments.189 Similarly,
if people tend to be unduly optimistic in predicting the outcomes of risky endeavors, then
they might be overly inclined to engage in REVEs that actually leave them worse off in
expected value terms. Some of these cognitive effects could be addressed without
banning particular REVEs, however, as discussed below.190
D. Costly Heterogeneity
A primary attraction of REVEs is their ability to accommodate heterogeneity in risk
preferences and risk-bearing capacities. But heterogeneity in risk-bearing arrangements
can also introduce costs, as the following sections explain.
1. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is a concern when individuals have private information about their
risk profiles that insurers (or reverse insurers) either cannot observe or are prohibited by
law from taking into account in pricing risk.191 The difficulty arises because individuals
DEBT (2000)), 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1089 (2002) (suggesting that "bankruptcy might be a particularly
useful incentive device in attracting employees to work in high-risk jobs, such as start-up ventures").
186
The reason relates to adverse selection. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 183, at 142-43 (observing
that the mandatory nature of bankruptcy protection prevents opting out patterns that would leave only bad
risks in the pool); see also Hynes, supra note 183, at 344-50.
187
See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual
Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining “internality” as a "within-person
externality").
188
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 55-58.
189
There is a vast literature on time preferences. For a helpful overview, see Shane Frederick et al.,
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review in TIME AND DECISION 13 (George Loewenstein
et al., eds., 2003). There is also some evidence that people prefer lump sums over present-value-equivalent
(or larger) streams of payments. See, e.g., David Fetherstonhaugh & Lee Ross, Framing Effects and Income
Flow Preferences in Decisions About Social Security, BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT
ECONOMICS 187 (Henry J. Aaron, ed., 1999).
190
See infra Part IV.B.1.
191
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, Lecture Presented to the
Federation of Swedish Industries (1973), in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS
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who possess this information are left free to choose whether or not to enter into a
particular risk-shifting transaction, and can be expected to make this selection in a
manner adverse to the insurer’s interests.192 Hence adverse selection is a problem
associated with heterogeneity in risk arrangements rather than with any particular risk
configuration.
For example, if people know their genetic risk profile, but an insurer either cannot
learn it or is forbidden to base pricing on it,193 insurance will be priced based on the
average expected losses of all sectors of the population. Since this price is likely to be a
bad deal for the best risks, we might expect to see them flee the pool, assuming they are
permitted to do so, spurring price increases in reaction to the now-riskier pool, further
exits, and so on.194 Insurers may try to arrest this dynamic by creating a menu of
insurance alternatives designed to induce good and bad risks to self-segregate.195
However, this approach tends to keep low-risk individuals from being able to purchase as
much insurance as they would prefer.196
The theoretical concerns about adverse selection would apply to reverse insurance
situations as well.197 A health insurance opt-out model would present mirror image
concerns to those associated with an opt-in model,198 while other reverse insurance
settings, such as the sale of tort claims, would present new problems. For example, if Rita
INFORMATION 136, 143, 147-48 (1984); Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629
(1976). The dynamics produced by such information asymmetries can also unravel markets other than those
in risk. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
192
See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 375-76 (2002/2003) (noting origins of the term “adverse selection” in
the insurance industry).
193
See The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 110 P.L. 233; 122 Stat. 881
(prohibiting genetic discrimination in group health insurance plans and employment).
194
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 100; Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability
and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM L. REV. 942, 946 (1988).
195
See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 191, at 632-37; Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1237-38 (2004); see also David M.
Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, NBER Working Paper No. 6107,
at 22-27 (1997) (discussing a variety of strategies that might be used to combat adverse selection).
196
Making a package designed for good risks sufficiently unattractive to bad risks is usually thought to
require reducing the quantity of insurance below what good risks would prefer. See Siegelman, supra note
195, at 1239-40; Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 191, at 636. But see Siegelman, supra note 195, at 1253
(noting the potential for screening applicants through the kinds of benefits provided, such as a health club
membership that would only be attractive to relatively fit individuals).
197
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 89, at 428-29 (describing how adverse selection creates difficulties
for markets in unmatured tort claims); Michael J. Fluhr, Unraveled: The Failure of Products Liability
Markets,
Harvard
Law
School
Student
Scholarship
Series,
No.
9
(2006),
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/students/papers/9 (examining an “unraveling” dynamic in the context of
products liability waivers).
198
The insurer would want to compensate low risks less for dropping out of the pool than it would
compensate high risks. But if it is unable to tell risks apart and offers everyone the low-risk price, only lowrisk people will find it a good deal, and high-risk people will stay in the pool. See Schwartz, supra note 89,
at 428-29.
OF
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does things that look like they are risky, but has special skills that actually render the
activities quite safe, then the payments she would receive in exchange for selling her
unmatured tort claims would be too high (assuming those payments were initially based
on the risks of an average actor with Rita's observable characteristics). As more skilled
actors like Rita enter the reverse insurance pool to obtain this bargain, however, reverse
insurers would reduce their payments to better reflect the exposure being transferred to
actors like Rita. As payouts drop, the reverse insurance product will become less
attractive to less skillful actors, prompting exits that make the deal less attractive to
reverse insurers, and so on.199 Adverse selection may thus explain not only the failure of
some insurance markets to emerge, but also the absence of certain kinds of reverse
insurance.
Despite the seemingly inexorable logic of adverse selection, serious questions have
been raised about its descriptive accuracy.200 For one thing, insureds do not always
possess better information than insurers about their risk profiles.201 The adverse selection
story also assumes that people become more keen to purchase insurance as their personal
chances of experiencing a negative event rises. But this may not be the case, at least not
in all risk contexts. A growing body of scholarship examines the possibility that a
converse phenomenon of “propitious” or “advantageous” selection better describes real
insurance markets.202 The effects observed in ordinary opt-in insurance markets might,
however, operate asymmetrically in an opt-out regime, depending on the mix of factors
driving insurance choices.203
2. Lumpiness
An additional argument against heterogeneity in risk arrangements has recently been
articulated by Jennifer Arlen in the context of malpractice liability.204 Rather than have a
single society-wide arrangement for malpractice liability, it would be possible for
individual patients to contract with health care providers over liability arrangements. For
199

Another potential domain in which adverse selection might operate in this context involves
individual differences in “capacity to suffer.” See Schwartz, supra note 89, at 428-29 (describing the
operation of an adverse selection dynamic analogous to the one presented in the text).
200
See e.g., Siegelman, supra note 195, at 1224 (“[A]lthough theory demonstrates that adverse
selection can occur, and some instances have certainly been documented, neither the theoretical models nor
the empirical studies provide much support for its widespread importance in insurance markets.”); id. at
1248-51 & 1278-80 & tbl. 2 (reviewing empirical work on adverse selection).
201
See Siegelman, supra note 195, at 1241-45; see also id. at 1251-52 (observing that information
asymmetries may run in favor of insurers). An adverse selection dynamic can also be produced if the law
requires insurers to ignore information that insureds are free to act upon.
202
See, e.g., David Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q. J. ECON. 1063 (1990); David de Meza &
David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 249 (2001); Hanming
Fang et al., Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market, 116 J.
POLIT. ECON. 303 (2008); Siegelman, supra note 195, at 1264-74.
203
See infra Part IV.C.
204
Jennifer Arlen, Contracting Out of Malpractice Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of
Choice, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448846.
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example, a patient might execute a waiver that would undo legal arrangements that place
liability on the doctor.205 Arlen argues, however, that inputs into medical care tend to be
“lumpy” or discontinuous, so that it is not possible for health care providers to perfectly
scale back their precaution levels in light of patients’ waivers.206 If it is also impossible to
selectively withhold the benefits of precaution from those patients who execute waivers,
Arlen argues, precaution levels may exhibit the character of a public good.207 The result
may be a system in which some patients try to free-ride on liability-induced precautions
without contributing to them.208 If every patient tries this, precaution levels may
eventually drop below the efficient level for most patients.209
Of course, the patient opting out of a malpractice liability regime would receive a
different monetary outcome in the event of an injury than would the patient who did not
execute a waiver. What the lumpiness analysis emphasizes is that the risk over which
parties transact is not fixed ex ante but instead depends at least in part on the risk-bearing
choices that other parties make.210 Lumpiness thus represents another facet of
interdependence in risk bearing which, like adverse selection, suggests costs may flow
from permitting heterogeneity in risk arrangements.
3. Lack of Standardization
Another cluster of concerns about permitting heterogeneity in risk arrangements
relates to concerns about lack of standardization. Standardization’s potential benefits and
costs have been explored in the context of property’s numerus clausus doctrine,211 as well
as in the literature on boilerplate contractual provisions.212 In these arenas, it has been
suggested that fixed menus or standardized terms can lower the cost of interactions by

205

See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 207.
See Arlen, supra note 204, manuscript at 24-25, 27-38.
207
Id. at 25, 27-28.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 25, 29. Arlen suggests it may be possible to address this problem by contracting through
Managed Care Organizations, although not without creating other difficulties. See id. at 36-48.
210
Analogous points about the interdependence of choices to opt in or out have been made in other
contexts. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (analyzing the effects on
institutions of the exit of those who, if they stayed, would have been the most vocal in seeking change);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 52,
80-81 (1987) (suggesting that the ability of parties to contract around a trust investment rule may dissipate
the will to litigate or to lobby for legislation that would improve the rule for everyone).
211
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Merrill & Smith,
supra note 153; Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 3D SERIES 237 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987); Nestor
Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008)
212
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of
Consent: Optimal Standardization in Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2009).
206
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reducing the amount of new information that must be gathered in each instance.213
Similar arguments may apply in the risk context. For example, homebuyers entering a
neighborhood filled with “homeowners” may find it easier to form settled expectations
about the likely behavior (political and otherwise) of their future neighbors if
homeownership inevitably connotes full ownership of upside and downside home
investment risk than if some unknown proportion of their fellow homeowners have
offloaded some or all of this risk. Similarly, to the extent that other laws or social policies
(including the provision of social insurance) are predicated on how certain risks are
arranged, homogeneity in risk bearing can simplify the design of these surrounding
elements.
IV. RETHINKING RISK REVISION
The discussion to this point has placed a large number of REVE-related categories,
examples, advantages, objections, and impediments on the table. In this last Part, I distill
some policy observations from the preceding analysis. Subpart A returns to the taxonomy
presented in Figure 3 to suggest that personal risk rearrangement opportunities follow
patterns that appear to be shaped more by history and societal framing than by logic or
meaningful normative distinctions. Some of the concerns that have been raised about
REVEs transactions can be addressed through minor redesigns, such as the removal of
inessential payment timing elements, as Subpart B explains. Subparts C and D,
respectively, show how manipulating the two policy levers that a focus on unbundled risk
spotlights—the choice of the default and the stickiness of the default—expands policy
space. The newly visible alternatives may offer new ways to counter biases, more
smoothly accommodate multiple policy objectives, or harness other asymmetries
associated with opting out rather than in.
A. Rows, Columns, Frames, and Bundles
One of the most striking facts highlighted by the taxonomy set out in Figure 3 is the
relative dearth of explicit bottom-row or “event-detracting” REVEs available to
individuals and households. Focusing just on the risk endstates produced by these
REVEs, there appears to be no plausible normative reason why event-detracting REVEs
should be treated differently than event-enhancing REVEs. To be sure, some eventdetracting REVEs would leave individuals exposed to potential losses or “ditches.” But
an indistinguishable state of exposure results when an individual simply fails to engage in
an analogous event-enhancing REVE. Concern about downside exposure certainly may
213

See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 211, at 8 (observing that unusual property forms inflict an
externality on those who must expend time learning about the entitlement’s attributes, while standardized
property forms economize on such costs); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 212, at 719-27 (detailing
“learning benefits” and “network benefits” of boilerplate contract terms).
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prompt mandatory insurance requirements, especially where unremediated losses will
produce externalities or trigger additional layers of societal assistance. But that argues for
distinguishing between the columns in Figure 3, not between the rows.
That there is nothing normatively superior about top-row REVEs becomes even
clearer when cell III from the top row is compared with cell IV in the bottom row. Both
of these entries involve upside risk, yet there no obvious reason to make it easier to
gamble for upside gains than it is to exchange potential “gravy” for a sum certain. If
gambles are voluntary in the top-row situation, then why should people be prohibited
from using a bottom-row REVE to attain the same risk position?
The point I am making is one about consistency, not about the overall level of risk
rearrangement opportunities. Thus, if people are not forced to purchase insurance that
will protect them against losses from one set of events (such as the death of a minor child
to an illness, or injuries that occur within the home due to one’s own carelessness), it is
difficult to understand why they should be prohibited from shedding societal insurance
against the same losses when they are caused by tortfeasors. The point can be flipped
around: if people are forced to insure at a very high level against losses caused by
tortfeasors, permitting them to be exposed to unremediated losses that result from other
causes requires some explanation.214
Similar analysis might be applied to insurance gaps that are a function of unexamined
bundling, such as the default packaging of exogenous housing market risk with
homeownership. If people are encouraged or even forced by their mortgage companies to
insure against one set of home value losses, such as those from fire, the practical
unavailability of insurance against a different set of losses to home values, such as those
associated with local market downturns, should at least invite inquiry. This is not to
suggest that perfect consistency in insurance opportunities across domains is required or
even recommended, only that we should be certain that differences map onto real
differences in the costs or consequences of offering REVEs, rather than merely emerging
as artifacts of the way that insurance choices are presently bundled and framed.
As already suggested, one coherent normative distinction might focus on preventing
exposure to unremediated losses, thus treating left-row REVEs differently than right-row
REVEs. Here too, consistency is important. If the goal is a certain subsistence level of
coverage, then transactions that “reverse insure” amounts over that level should not be
deemed any more problematic than the failure to buy insurance in excess of the minimum
level. In some cases, REVEs could be made subject to minimum insurance
requirements215 or bonding requirements.216
214

Similar questions that have been raised about the dramatically different treatment that different
kinds of bad luck receive. See Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians,
12 LEGAL THEORY 181, 187-88 (2006); see also Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995).
215
Notably, most of the proposals for selling unmatured tort claims contemplate not that would-be
victims walk away with large, unrestricted stacks of cash, but rather that part of the savings be used to
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B. Tweaking Transactions
Certain kinds of REVEs may be viewed as problematic not because of the risk
endstates they produce, but due to fear that features of the transaction itself will induce
people to choose wrongly. Similarly, it might be argued that the heterogeneity produced
by REVEs can uniquely create difficulties within certain domains, even when seemingly
analogous domains tolerate well the heterogeneity that comes from voluntary insurance.
Yet in evaluating whether presently absent REVEs must or should remain so, it is
important to examine where simple design tweaks can address these sources of concern.
Although there may be many modifications capable of meeting various objections, two
simple ones are considered here: modifying the timing and form of payments, and
making the transaction a triangular one.
1. Timing and Form of Payments
As discussed above, insurance and other REVEs allow individuals to redistribute
money among possible states of the world.217 However, REVEs also commonly move
money from one part of the life cycle to another. If impediments to borrowing or saving
exist, REVEs may be affirmatively sought out as a means of moving money earlier or
later in time. While ordinary insurance moves money to a later point in the life cycle (to
the future state in which one is ill or injured), reverse insurance typically moves money
earlier in the life cycle, to the uninjured state. Thus, where ordinary insurance
incorporates an element of saving,218 reverse insurance seems to incorporate an element
of dissaving.
If we think that people are likely to be poor agents of their future selves primarily due
to factors like myopia or a tendency to discount hyperbolically, this conflation of risk and
liquidity might cause people to mischoose REVEs. Thus, some objections to eventdetracting risk transactions may really be objections to the temporal structure that the
choice typically takes. For example, some might oppose allowing people to sell their
unmatured tort claims (particularly in the absence of any first-party insurance
requirement) out of a concern about myopia.219 If people are short-sighted, they might
grab the lump of immediate cash without carefully weighing the long-run consequences
and later come to regret their decision.
Notice, however, that it is possible to design mechanisms that break apart time

purchase other insurance, typically first-party or no-fault (such as workers comp). See, e.g., Cooter, supra
note 4, at 395; O’Connell, supra note 91.
216
Cf. Shavell, supra note 210.
217
See text accompanying notes 24-29, supra.
218
See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 47 (“Most private insurance involves a substantial element of
intertemporal loss spreading. In this sense it is just a form of saving.”).
219
See Schwartz, supra note 89, at 425 (expressing the concern that potential victims would sell their
unmatured tort claims too cheaply due to “irrationally high discount rates”).
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preferences and risk preferences. Rather than receive the expected value of one's
unmatured tort claims all at once, for example, the payments could be spread out over a
series of years or decades. Similarly, concerns about hyperbolic discounting might be
addressed by interposing some period of time, such as six months, between the sale of the
claim and the delivery of the (interest-adjusted) proceeds.220 As long as the present value
equivalent of the payment is eventually made available, the purposes served by the REVE
as such (catering to heterogeneity in risk preferences) would be fulfilled.
Likewise, to the extent that people exhibit a bias for lump sums over equivalent
streams of payments, this feature could be removed from a given REVE. The point is a
general one: any considerations that are extraneous to the concentration or spread of risk,
whether involving the timing or form of payments or the time, place, or conditions under
which transactions are made available, can be altered to more clearly present individuals
with the choice between variable outcomes and the expected value equivalent. The fact
that these two options tend to come bundled with other features presents no impediment
once we focus on the issue of risk unbundling as such.221
Two caveats are in order. First, people’s cognitive biases likely extend to matters of
risk-taking and insurance, as well as to questions of the timing of payment.222 Thus,
taking certain temporal elements out of the equation is no guarantee against mischoosing.
Yet the discussion here is about clarifying what is essential to a given REVE and what
can be removed from it. Policymakers might indeed deem mischoosing to be too great a
hazard even after removing, say, the opportunity to immediately obtain a lump of cash
from a REVE. On the other hand, it is possible that the remaining cognitive concerns
could be addressed separately, as through risk defaults that counter cognitive biases.223
Second, there are serious normative questions about whether it is appropriate to
constrict the temporal tradeoffs that people can make in the course of reallocating risk,
since people may have quite rational reasons for wanting to receive payouts on a
particular schedule.224 The question is sharpened by the fact that the capacity to deliver
220

Hyperbolic discounting, which involves very steep discounting in the immediate short run and
much shallower discounting further out, can produce preference reversals as a pair of temporally separated
rewards draws near. See, e.g., Frederick et al., supra note 189, at 25.
221
To be sure, choices about payment timing and form could constrain risk-bearing insofar as these
choices keep people gaining immediate access to funds that might be used in the interim for risky
investments or additional REVEs transactions. If people could use the prospect of the upcoming payments
as collateral for immediate loans, these constraints would be lifted, although possibly at the cost of
defeating the purpose of the change in timing and form. The cognitive response triggered by an immediate
lump sum of cash in hand, however, may be quite different from the knowledge that one can use the dollar
amount to obtain financing.
222
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14; CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 55-58 (discussing both
"paternalistic" and "semipaternalistic" rationales for doubting that voluntary insurance coverage will be
adequate).
223
See infra Part IV.C.
224
This relates to the general difficulty in determining when an individual’s choice should be viewed
as a “mistake.” See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New
Paternalism. NY Univ. Law Econ Res. Pap. No. 08-60, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1310732.
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immediate liquidity is one of the primary attractions of REVEs, given imperfections in
capital markets. Yet if removing worrisome temporal elements is the only way to
introduce a presently unavailable REVE, then choice is expanded rather than contracted
by the move. My point is not to advocate for any particular design choice, but only to
emphasize that risk allocations can be reconfigured in ways that need not inevitably entail
particular payment arrangements.
2. Third Party Transactors
Although parties to an interaction, such as a manufacturer and a consumer, could
reverse the risk arrangement as between themselves, they may find it beneficial to
involve third party insurers or reverse insurers in the REVE transaction. As already
noted, third party transactors make possible triangular risk arrangements that permit both
parties to be insured or exposed.225 The involvement of third parties may also carry some
additional advantages that can help to meet practical and normative objections to REVEs.
First, opening up REVEs in a given area to third party transactors fosters competition,
which can help to address the concern that some parties will feel pressured into selling
claims too cheaply (or paying too dearly for them).226 Competition does not necessarily
safeguard parties against making what are (for them) bad bargains, but it does provide
some check against monopolistic or exploitative pricing.
Second, the availability of third party transactors can help to address one of the
reasons that default rules are often so potent: the fear that moving away from them will
send a negative signal to the party with whom one is interacting.227 Often, parties will
want their counterparties to know about their risk arrangements precisely because of what
it signals about them,228 but in other instances the third party involvement may helpfully
mute an unwanted signal.
Third, the availability of third party transactors can avoid some of the difficulties that
might otherwise attend heterogeneous risk arrangements. For example, if it is unworkable
for patients to selectively opt out of medical malpractice coverage because the
precautions of the doctors are not scalable,229 patients could instead go to a reverse
insurer to whom they could sell their rights and who would collect on their behalf,
225

See supra Part I.C.
See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 386-87.
227
See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 13; Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of
Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 225-26 (2001). Of course, transacting with a third party would not help if the
persons to whom one fears sending an adverse signal would be aware of that transaction, as might be the
case if concerns are mostly about the signals sent to loved ones or even to oneself. See Posting of Robin
Hanson to Overcoming Bias, http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/09/insurance-as-signal.html (Sept. 14,
2009, 21:45).
228
For example, if a party seeking to take on risk fears that her counterparty will take insufficient
precautions if relieved of exposure, a triangular arrangement would address that worry. See Cooter & Porat,
supra note 3; see also Hanson supra note 227 (discussing the possibility that the purchase of insurance
could in some contexts convey care and concern).
226

46

Fennell

[27-Apr-10

leaving the doctor’s liability unchanged but merely altering who is the payee.230
Similarly, a triangular arrangement that leaves both parties exposed to risk would address
moral hazard concerns that might otherwise be present.231
As these observations show, if direct reversals of risk allocations between two parties
present difficulties, curtailing REVEs is not the only possible solution. Another
alternative may be to even more fully unbundle risk from the underlying interaction by
throwing open REVEs opportunities to third parties.
C. Defaults
The law always makes an initial choice about risk allocation, even when it does
nothing more than leave a particular set of losses where they fall.232 A focus on risk
customization emphasizes that society’s choice set is not limited to mandatory insurance
or voluntary opt-in insurance; it is also possible to start with a system that insures people
against loss and permit them to opt out. In this subpart, I discuss some well-known and
less-recognized considerations that bear on this choice between defaults.
1. Sticky Starting Points
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that defaults tend to stick.233 This provides
one reason to think carefully about the risk-related defaults that we have in place,
including those that are embedded without comment in legal rules or social policies. If
we think that one risk allocation is generally best for most of the people, most of the time,
making that our default might seem to make sense—at least if we assume that those for
whom it is not best do not differ systematically in terms of the size of the losses they will
suffer or the difficulties they will face in moving away from the default.234
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See supra Part III.D.2.
Cf. Cooter & Porat, supra note 3, at 225.
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Id.
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See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1091 (“When a loss is left where it falls in an auto
accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an
entitlement to be free of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim’s friends, if they are stronger,
from taking compensation from the injurer”) (footnote omitted).
233
Some of the most well-known research on the power of default rules is in the context of 401(k)
plans. See, e.g., Bridgette C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON.1149 (2001); James J. Choi et al., Passive Decisions
and Potent Defaults, in ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 59 (David A. Wise, ed. 2005). However,
work on risk-taking has also documented significant default effects. See Johnson et al., supra note 14, at
46-48 (presenting experimental findings showing significant effects depending on the default risk regime);
id. at 48 (observing that 20% of New Jersey motorists elected a “full right to sue” where state law required
opting into this right, whereas 75% of Pennsylvania motorists retained this right when it was made the
default under state law); see also Sunstein, supra note 14, at 114 (discussing these default effects).
234
See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles, Posner on Economic Loss in Tort: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1817-18 (2007). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91 (describing “penalty
defaults” which “are purposefully set at what the parties would not want”).
230
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A number of cognitive explanations for default stickiness have been explored,235 but
three are of particular interest here.236 First is a simple pricing effect. Changing a risk
allocation requires effort, and effort is expensive to exert.237 Second is the “implicit
advice” that defaults are often thought to provide.238 If people trust the authority
presumed to be behind the selection, they may be especially likely to stay with the risk
allocation.239 Taking these two points together, sticking with defaults can be viewed as a
way of economizing on search costs.240 A third explanation, closely related, stems from
the cognitive distinction between acts and omissions.241 An act is more likely than an
omission to trigger regret (and hence the kind of anticipated regret that gives people
pause).242 Where the act would involve moving away from coverage for a risk, making a
choice also inevitably draws attention to the risk.243 Because knowledge of risks and of
235

See, e.g., Isaac Dinner et al., Partitioning Default Effects: Why People Choose Not to Choose (June
26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352488, at 3 (collecting citations and identifying three
categories of reasons for default stickiness: “effort,” “implied endorsement,” and “reference dependence”);
Choi et al., supra note 233, at 60 (listing three reasons that defaults matter in their model: the fact that
moving away is a costly “act of commission,” the desire to exploit the “option value of waiting,” and the
“tendency to procrastination”).
236
A fourth, the interaction between signaling and defaults, is omitted here because of its potential to
be redressed through third party risk arrangements, as discussed above. See text accompanying note 227,
infra.
237
See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 235, at 3. The idea that defaults can be powerful even when the ability
to opt out is made readily and cheaply available lies at the heart of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler's
"libertarian paternalism" proposals. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). Empirical work suggesting that making
decisions is cognitively draining supports this effect. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister, The Psychology of
Irrationality: Why People Make Foolish, Self-Defeating Choices, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC
DECISIONS, VOL. 1: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 3, 12-14 (Brocas & Carrillo, eds., 2003) (reviewing
literature on “decision fatigue”).
238
See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 233, at 70 (noting defaults may provide “implicit advice”); see also
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 35, 83; Dinner, supra note 235, at 3. A related possibility is that
people might assume some help will be forthcoming if things go systematically awry with the default
choice (as in a natural disaster, where the default is to remain uninsured).
239
Some scholars have noted a parallel in Lon Fuller’s discussion of formalism as serving (among
other things) a “cautionary” function. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 124 (citing and discussing
Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941)); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky
Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 392-93 (2007).
240
For a discussion of the relevance of search costs to insurance decisions, see, e.g., Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 14, at 76-77.
241
See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 48 (discussing potential relevance to insurance decisions
of work showing an asymmetry between acts and omissions); Choi et al., supra note 233, at 60 (noting
costliness of “acts of commission”). This regret-avoidance explanation, to the extent it hinges on moves
from the status quo, also fits within Dinner et al.’s category of “reference dependence.” See Dinner et al.,
supra note 235, at 3.
242
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 Sci. Am. 160,
173 (1982); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE
73 (1992); Daniel Kahneman, Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 375, 388–92 (NEAL J. ROESE & JAMES M. OLSON
EDS., 1995); supra note 167 and accompanying text.
243
See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 167, n. 25 ("[o]pting in [to liability] may be different from opting
out, for it might seem that where one party opts into liability, he has a greater awareness of what he is doing
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the availability of insurance plays an important role in coverage decisions,244 the default
setting’s capacity to influence what people pay attention to could prove independently
important.245
In the present context, these cognitive factors are only part of the story. Altering a
risk-bearing arrangement typically entails nontrivial administrative costs. Where a third
party insurer or reverse insurer provides the service of rearranging risk, the REVE will
not be actuarially fair, but will instead build in an administrative increment. As a result,
some people who would have accepted the REVE at an actuarially fair price will instead
stick with the default. The larger the administrative costs are, the stickier the default will
be, although this stickiness can be reduced through subsidies or measures designed to
reduce transaction costs. If there are asymmetries in the administrative costs of moving in
one direction rather than another, this would of course offer an additional reason for
attending carefully to the default choice.
2. Heterogeneously Inertial
Default rules, for the reasons already suggested, tend to be remarkably inertial. But it
is likely that people are heterogeneous in their susceptibility to inertia's pull.246 This
possibility becomes interesting if we posit that those differences might be correlated with
either risk preferences or risk profiles. Such correlations do not seem implausible,
although it is not self-evident which way they would run.247 Those who behave in ways
than when he allows the other party to opt out of liability."). After providing a counterexample in which a
"giant milling company us[es] a form contract requiring opting into liability," Calabresi concludes that
"knowledge or awareness of risk may affect the choice of whom we wish to hold initially liable and
whether we wish to allow such a party to exculpate himself." Id.
244
See, e.g., KUNREUTHER, supra note 43, at 57-61.
245
This point relates to the argument for a “penalty default”—a default so unattractive that it
encourages opting out, and hence conscious consideration of the alternatives. See Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 13, at 91; see also Choi et al., supra note 233, at 72.
246
Some existing empirical work has uncovered patterns of heterogeneity in default-stickiness. See,
e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 233, at 1158-61 & tbl. IV, 1171-73 & tbl. VIII, 185 (2001) (finding that a
large employer's switch from an opt-in 401(k) program to one featuring automatic enrollment with an optout had much larger effects on young workers, low-earning workers, women, and minorities; not only did
these groups participate at much higher levels under automatic enrollment than they did under an opt-in
system, they were more likely to stick with the specific default contribution level and investment
allocation). The possibility that moving away from one default might be easier than moving away from
another has been raised in a number of contexts. Such an effect might occur (among other reasons) if the
parties who occupy one side of a given transaction are systematically less likely to agree to a switch if they
begin with the entitlement than are the parties who occupy the other side of the transaction. See Sunstein,
supra note 14, at 122-23 (raising the possibility that workers would overvalue particular rights and be
unwilling to waive them, even when it would be in their best interest to do so).
247
Recent empirical work has explored heterogeneity in risk preferences. See, e.g., Thomas Dohmen et
al., Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(in a study of German adults, finding greater risk aversion among people with lower scores on an IQ test);
Daniel J. Benjamin, et al. Who Is ‘Behavioral’? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences (2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=675264 (in a study of Chilean high school students, finding less
“small-stakes” risk aversion among with higher scores on standardized tests); Luigi Guiso & Monica
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that make them better risks or who are very averse to risk may also be adept at
micromanaging their lives and practiced at overcoming inertia. If people are bad risks
because they are careless, that lack of care might manifest itself in a tendency not to
bother with the hassles of gathering information, filling out paperwork, or otherwise
proactively engaging in decisionmaking. On the other hand, perhaps risk-seekers are
marked by an extreme lack of complacence that makes them less susceptible to inertia.
Moreover, to the extent that sticking with a default means accepting a social planner’s
advice on a particular question or conforming one's behavior to that of others,248 riskseekers might be more willing to break away from the pack or shun official
recommendations.
In either case, these differences could bear on the question of adverse selection. In the
standard adverse selection story, people who are bad risks opt in while people who are
good risks stay out. But scholarly exploration of the converse phenomenon of
“advantageous” or “propitious” selection raises some interesting questions.249 If much of
what drives advantageous selection in the opt-in model is simple inertia on the part of the
less good risks (who stay out of the pool), we might see more of these less good risks in
the risk pool if the default were flipped so that everyone starts off insured. On the other
hand, if risk seekers are especially prone to action, their exits under such a system might
outstrip any exits from the pool by the good risks.250 In addition, if the risk aversion of
many good risks is significantly influenced by framing, the prospect of taking on
additional exposure through a reverse insurance move might be much less attractive than
a failure to insure in an opt-in system. This could lead some good risks to stay in a
Paiella, Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk, 6 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASSOC. 1109 (2008)
(examining relationship between wealth and risk aversion, as well as other aspects of heterogeneity in risk
preferences); Peggy D. Dwyer et al., Gender Differences in Revealed Risk Taking: Evidence from Mutual
Fund Investors, 76 ECON. LETTERS 151 (2002) (finding evidence that women accept less investment risk
than men, as well as positive effects of wealth and education on willingness to take investment risks);
Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 448, 449-54 (2009)
(reviewing experimental findings on the greater risk aversion of women, discussing possible reasons, and
noting exceptions in managerial and professional subsets); Jonah Gelbach et al., Passive Discrimination:
When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 817-19 (2009) (reviewing empirical
literature on gender differences in risk preferences). Another interesting line of work assesses
inconsistencies in risk preferences across domains. See, e.g., Levon Barseghyan et al., Are Risk Preferences
Stable
Across
Contexts?
Evidence
from
Insurance
Data
(2009),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1220663.
248
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
249
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
250
Perhaps suggestive on this point is evidence on when low risk insureds do and do not drop out of
policies with “guaranteed renewability” provisions that insure against selective experience-rated increases
in policy premiums. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 351-50 (2d ed. 2004) (attributing the availability of guaranteed renewability provisions for
individuals and the resistance to such provisions in small group insurance settings in the period prior to
legal mandate to the higher transaction costs of switching for individuals); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note
14, at 107-08 (citing Harrington & Niehaus, and observing that “[t]he same type of inertia and inattention
that sometimes results in failures of insurance markets to emerge . . . may sometimes preserve them as
well”).
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default-insured system even when they would not opt in under a default-uninsured
system.
The direction and magnitude of these effects would be an excellent avenue for further
empirical research. It is possible that adverse selection effects could be aggravated or
mitigated based entirely on default choice. If so, then flipping defaults could make some
REVEs that have been ruled out on adverse selection grounds more feasible.
3. Risk and Redistribution
The choice of default may often seem to be driven by distributive considerations.
Providing a taxpayer with publicly funded insurance and letting her opt out for cash
places her in a different distributive position than simply leaving her free to buy her own
coverage from a no-insurance baseline.251 But the choice of default need not dictate a
particular distributive result, given the ability to combine different funding mechanisms
with different risk allocation baselines. Thus, an opt-in system can be coupled with
subsidies, and an opt-out system can be funded by individual insureds in a manner
corresponding to the pricing structure of private insurance (the direct deduction of
insurance premiums from paychecks offers a concrete example).
Consideration of alternative defaults can become especially important when risk
pooling consciously builds in a redistributive element, as it often does. The example of
genetic testing offers a case in point. Suppose society has decided it is normatively
inappropriate for people with different levels of genetic risk to bear different insurance
costs. One approach is to pass a law mandating that insurers ignore the results of genetic
tests in setting premiums.252 If people know their own risk levels, however, those at lower
risk may exit the pool to avoid cross-subsidizing those at higher risk—the usual adverse
selection problem.253 But if we were to switch to a new baseline in which everyone is
automatically insured absent a decision to opt out, it becomes feasible to maintain
society’s normative commitment while eliminating the feature of the situation responsible
for the adverse selection dynamic—the suppression of relevant risk-related information.
To see this point, suppose health insurance is provided to everyone as an initial matter
and funded in a way that does not distinguish among genetic risks.254 Because the cost of
covering those with risky genes would be built into the public finance system and spread
across all taxpayers, everyone would be a mandatory participant in the redistributive
251

This assumes, as seems plausible, that the funding mechanism for public insurance draws from
individuals in a pattern that differs from the price structure each would encounter in purchasing private
insurance.
252
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
253
See supra notes 193-196, and accompanying text.
254
Although the example in the text focuses on genetic risks, the same analysis would apply to
preexisting conditions or any other factor that society might view as normatively inappropriate to factor
into the cost of coverage, such as the status of having been a victim of domestic violence. See Deborah S.
Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Actually Fair? A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355 (1997).
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scheme that subsidizes the premiums of those with unlucky genes.255 Yet it would still be
possible to allow people to sell or relinquish their individual insurance claims against the
system in exchange for a sum representing the expected value of those claims (less some
administrative increment). Thus, someone at low genetic risk could opt out of insurance,
but would get only the low expected value payment associated with their risk class; this
would often be much less than the amount they had paid towards the program in taxes
because they would not be permitted to opt out of the redistributive component of the
policy.256 Unlike in the opt-in case, there is no public policy difficulty with pricing the
expected value of the claims of those opting out as accurately as possible, using genetic
information or any other available information sources; indeed, such pricing would be
necessary to keep the system from unraveling.
Thus, there may be an interesting public policy asymmetry between taking account of
certain kinds of information (here, genetic predispositions) in pricing insurance premiums
(the opt-in price) versus taking account of that information in pricing reverse insurance
(the opt-out price). My objective is not to defend this particular approach to insurance or
to the use of genetic information, but rather to show that it is not impossible to break
apart the redistributive and risk-pooling elements that a particular social policy embodies,
and to allow people to opt out of the latter without endangering the former. By making
use of relevant information rather than suppressing it, an adverse selection dynamic can
be avoided. The same principle could be applied to a wide range of situations in which
risk pooling is combined with redistribution. We might, for example, be more willing to
allow people to opt out of the certain portions of the social welfare system if we could
accurately price their expected claims against the system (very close to zero for some
individuals).257
D. Pushing, Sticking, Blocking
After setting an initial risk allocation, society must also decide how hard or easy it
will be to move away from that allocation.258 Making a risk arrangement the default
selection makes it effortless to choose, while an alternative that people are literally
blocked or stopped from selecting is prohibitively difficult to choose. Between these
255

For discussion of explicit and implicit ways to package redistribution based on (or insurance
against) unlucky genetic endowments, see generally Logue & Slemrod, supra note 138.
256
People at high genetic risk could also opt out and received the (higher) expected value equivalent of
their potential claims—a move that would effectively convert society’s in-kind redistribution to them (in
the form of insurance) into cash redistribution. I thank Ariel Porat for discussions on this point. For further
discussion of the alternative ways in which society might choose to meet the normative commitment that
genetic nondiscrimination rules embody, see Logue & Slemrod, supra note 138.
257
There might be other reasons to oppose such a move however, given the potential interdependence
among risk choices. For example, allowing opt-outs may change the political economy in undesirable ways.
See supra note 210.
258
The relative neglect of this question has been noted in other contexts. See McDonnell, supra note
239, at 384 (“Despite the longstanding debate over default versus mandatory rules, scholars have paid

52

Fennell

[27-Apr-10

extremes lie a spectrum of possibilities, from making a choice simpler or more attractive
to making it more difficult or less attractive.259
1. Catalysts
Making a risk allocation the default alternative is often the most direct and powerful
way to encourage its adoption, but this alternative may not always be feasible or may be
undesirable for other reasons. In such cases, other ways to “unstick” the default selection
may be sought. Thaler and Sunstein’s notion of “one-click paternalism”260 focuses on
keeping opting-out costs low in the context of governmentally chosen defaults that are
(by assumption) deemed to be normatively desirable. Significantly, supply of the
alternative arrangement is guaranteed by the design of the policy itself to be delivered
upon a single mouse-click. Nor do the proponents of such systems fear that people will
opt for the alternative too rarely; because the superiority of the default selection is
presumed, small numbers of opt-outs are counted as successes, not occasions for
concern.261 But once we examine default selections outside of this paradigm, easing or
encouraging shifts may require overcoming obstacles on the supply side, the demand
side, or both.
On the supply side, it is obvious that a REVE will be maximally difficult to elect if no
counterparty is willing to enter into it.262 New markets in REVEs might be jump-started
through governmental incentives directed at spurring innovation in risk263 or other efforts
aimed at reducing transaction costs associated with reversing background risk
allocations.264 Reversibility could also be advanced by requiring parties to offer an
alternative risk arrangement along with the default, or subsidizing them for offering this
alternative. Similarly, it would be possible to require that a REVE be permitted only
when the default arrangement remains available at a separately stated price.265 For
example, although the law often disallows waivers of liability (an attempted reversal of
the risk allocation in the tort system), some commentators have argued such waivers

much less attention to how easy it is to opt out of the default rules - that is, how ‘sticky’ the rules are.”).
259
See McDonnell, supra note 239, at 385 (2007) (“Rather than the binary choice of labeling a rule as
default or mandatory, we can place various rules along a spectrum of stickiness.”).
260
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 248-49 (discussing "one-click paternalism," which aims for
opt-out procedures that are no more difficult than a single mouse-click).
261
See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 237, at 1191 (stating that low numbers of people opting out of
default savings plans “supports (though it does not prove) the claim that they are helped by a system that
makes joining easy”). For a critique of this argument, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is An
Oxymoron, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2005).
262
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 98-110 (examining supply-side issues).
263
See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 163, at 208.
264
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 116-17.
265
This could be viewed as dampening risk modifications rather than catalyzing them, insofar as it
requires dual pricing to accompany a REVE offering where doing so is costly. On the other hand, it might
improve the use of REVEs by addressing some of the mischoosing concerns that might otherwise
accompany them.
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should be permitted if they are offered along with a separately priced alternative in which
the traditional tort liability relationship is preserved.266 We could imagine additional
variations on this theme in which the two prices, or the gap between them, is not left
entirely to the discretion of the party offering the good or service but is instead keyed to
difference in the costs of offering the two alternatives. Such refinements bear an
intellectual kinship with liability rules, in which transactions are eased by permitting one
party to unilaterally accomplish a desired change in entitlement structure upon payment
of a specified price.267
Additional problems exist on the demand side.268 Research on consumer choices
about insurance has found that behavior diverges considerably from a utility
maximization model, with consumers variously purchasing “too much” and “too little”
insurance.269 Where a rational maximizer model would predict a greater willingness to
pay to insure against large unlikely losses than against routine small losses, people often
exhibit the opposite tendency.270 People are generally reluctant to purchase insurance
against catastrophic low-probability events,271 but often obtain seemingly anomalous
levels of coverage against small and routine losses, such as minor preventative health
expenditures or problems with low-cost consumer goods.272 Similarly, deductibles tend to
be much smaller than utility theory would predict.273
A variety of approaches to these apparent patterns of mischoosing have been

266

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 407 (1988); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for
Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 821-23 (1994) (discussing this proposal and quoting ALI
Reporters’ Study that deemed the idea worthy of “further attention”).
267
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092. More generally, entitlement theory could bring
important insights to risk shifting. Morris took a step in this direction by including “Transferred Claim
rules” in her taxonomy of entitlements. Morris, supra note 4, at 866-75.
268
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 174-87 (examining demand-side issues).
269
See, e.g., BARON, supra note 23, at 508-11; Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14; Johnson et al.,
supra note 14; Slovic et al., supra note 23. As the discussion above suggested, however, there are some
additional factors that complicate assumptions about what is the “right” amount of insurance for people to
purchase. See text accompanying notes 30-34, supra. For example, if people derive utility from insurance
in ways other than through the money it provides, their behavior might be maximizing even if it would not
appear that way to an onlooker. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
270
Empirical work provides some confirmation of these patterns. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 23
(presenting and analyzing results of experimental studies that gave people choices about how and whether
to insure against risks in hypotheticals involving draws from an urn and a more concrete “farm game”).
271
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 92-93. There are some exceptions to this pattern
that suggest errors running in the opposite direction. For example, people appear overly willing to insure
against extremely unlikely events that are highly mentally available. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (flight
insurance). There is also heterogeneity in willingness to pay for insurance coverage at all. For example, a
significant subset of people (dubbed “invincibles” in the literature to signify their overoptimism) shuns
health insurance altogether. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 81.
272
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 65-66, 113-14; Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note
139, at 19-20, 25-28.
273
See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 88-90; Justin Sydnor, (Over)Insuring Modest Risks,
unpublished manuscript (August 2009) available at http://wsomfaculty.case.edu/sydnor/deductibles.pdf.
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discussed in the literature, including strategies that rely on bundling and framing.274 To
the extent these approaches lower cognitive resistance to welfare-enhancing (or
externality-reducing) REVEs, they would qualify as catalysts here. Other demand-side
efforts might be directed at generating information and social support for new or
unconventional risk-bearing arrangements.
2. Dampeners
The fact that a risk allocation is not the default already puts something of a damper on
it. But it is possible to do more, short of outright bans, to either discourage particular
choices or minimize instances of mischoosing. Some of the design approaches discussed
above, such as altering the timing and form of payments, could serve that function. Other
familiar strategies to dampen shifts would include a more cumbersome administrative
process, regulations that have the effect of raising the price of the alternative, waiting
periods before a choice becomes final, and so on—all of which impose costs on those
who wish to engage in such shifts.275
The ultimate dampener, of course, is an outright ban. While this may be appropriate
in some contexts, the preceding discussion suggests that we might first consider precisely
why a given REVE seems objectionable, whether its objectionable features can be costeffectively excised without doing away with it altogether, and whether there is some
measure short of a prohibition that would respond to concerns about it. Perhaps the
strongest case for bans emerges where heterogeneity in risk arrangements is itself
problematic, as through adverse selection. Even there, however, it is worth examining
whether heterogeneity reached from different starting points with different degrees of
stickiness can do a better job of avoiding these difficulties.
CONCLUSION
Familiar devices like insurance policies and lottery tickets allow people to rearrange
risk, but they offer access to only a small subset of imaginable risk configurations. Law,
public policy, and entrenched commercial and social practices also pervasively structure
risk, but they typically do so without comment and without offering any means for
undoing the resulting risk allocation. In this paper, I have used the REVEs framework to
direct attention to the enormous number of untapped possibilities for reallocating risk.
Unlike most existing work on the topic, however, this paper does not argue the merits of
any particular rearrangement of risk. Rather, I have tried to make a case for paying
attention to risk customization itself. Doing so not only points the way to new alternatives
274

See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 14, at 111-18; Slovic et al., supra note 23, at 70-71;
Baker & Siegelman, supra note 81; see also Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 42-46.
275
In-kind impositions (waiting periods, extra mouse-clicks, queues) are usually thought to be
especially costly because they destroy value outright rather than merely transferring it elsewhere. See, e.g.,
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 342-43 (1982).
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but also illuminates gaps in existing opportunities to trade in unbundled risk.
Many theoretically possible REVEs are doubtless unavailable for very good
reasons—perhaps markets for them cannot be sustained, the moral hazard problems
attending them are too great, or the heterogeneity that they would introduce into risk
allocations would be independently problematic. But it is also quite likely that many of
the missing entries in the menu are absent for reasons that do not withstand careful
scrutiny. Society's framing of various risk situations may have needlessly placed certain
options off-limits, and the tendency of discussions to conflate distinct objections may
also have impeded resort to new risk management tools. Finding new, workable
alternatives to existing risk configurations offers the possibility of efficiency gains. An
expanded menu of alternatives may also offer as-yet-unexplored opportunities to realize
gains by exploiting the asymmetries associated with starting in one place rather than
another. Asking how an alternative risk arrangement would look also directs attention to
the often unacknowledged ways in which law spreads risk across groups or concentrates
it on particular parties. Even if particular REVEs are ultimately rejected as unworkable,
considering them carries the threshold benefit of allowing us to see more clearly how
existing arrangements manage risk.
At bottom, the paper argues for a move to a new analytic baseline in thinking about
risk. Risk is presently distributed and rearranged in very limited ways that are unlikely to
represent the full complement of socially useful configurations. With Arrow, we might
ask ourselves what the world would look like if “we could introduce into the economic
system any institutions we wish for shifting risks instead of being confined to those
developed historically.”276 Rather than unreflectively accept the smattering of risk
arrangements that history and cognition have served up over time or engage in a
haphazard and piecemeal contemplation of specific alternatives, scholars and
policymakers might usefully work backwards from the expanded set of alternatives
suggested by the logic of risk unbundling.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lee Fennell
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lfennell@uchicago.edu
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Arrow, Insurance, supra note 1, at 138.
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